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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ANTITAKEOVER DEVICES EMPLOYED
IN THE NONCOERCIVE TENDER OFFER CONTEXT:
MAKING SENSE OF THE UNOCAL TEST
GREGG H. KANTERt
When... battles for corporate dominance spawn legal controversies, the judi-
cial role is neither to displace the judgment of the participants nor to predeter-
mine the outcome. Rather, the responsibility of the Court is to insure that
rules designed to safeguard the fairness of the takeover process be enforced. 1
Under Delaware law,2 the board of directors' role in a hostile
tender offer has changed dramatically in recent years. A hostile
tender offer3 is a takeover mechanism by which the tender offeror
seeks to acquire a controlling interest in the target corporation.4
Since a tender offer is addressed directly to individual shareholders
without securing the approval of the target corporation's board,5 the
directors were traditionally almost powerless against this type of
takeover attempt. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law'
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' the only function of the
t B.A. 1985, J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania.
I Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984).
2 This paper's discussion will be limited to Delaware corporate law, which is
considered the most influential in the country. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986); Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw.
247, 248 (1989) (stating that Delaware corporate law governs "the largest proportion
of the largest business transactions in history"); Labaton, Judge Is Focus of Time Inc.
Contest, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989, at D1, col. 3 ("In corporate law, Delaware, the
home of more major companies than any other state, has become more influential
than the United States Supreme Court.").
3 A tender offer is "generally defined as a public invitation addressed to all
shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for a specified price within a
limited period of time." Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control. A Critical Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL.J. CORP. L. 865, 866 n.l (1987).
4 See Kreider, Corporate Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule. An Update, CORP.
PRAC. COMMENTATOR 119, 120 (1988). A controlling interest in a corporation is the
ownership of a sufficient number of voting shares to dictate corporate action.
5 See id.
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 1-398 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & Supp. V 1987).
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target directors in the process is giving an opinion concerning the
tender offer.8 With the advent and judicial sanctioning of antitake-
over devices to prevent unsolicited tender offers, however, the target
board has taken a more prominent role in the tender offer process. 9
The ability to enact an antitakeover device, or redeem an existing
one, has granted the target board a virtual veto power over tender
offers.10
This assumption of power in the tender offer context creates an
inherent conflict of interest for the target's directors." The fiduciary
duty of directors to the shareholders requires the maximization of
8 SEC Rule 14e-2, issued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires
the target board to recommend acceptance or rejection of the tender offer, to express
neutrality towards the offer, or to state reasons for an inability to take a position on
the offer, within 10 days after the commencement of the offer. This opinion,
however, is used merely to assist the shareholders in their evaluation of the tender
offer and has no binding effect. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1988).
Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the target board's impotence in
tender offers sharply contrasts with the board's role in other transactions involving a
transfer of corporate control. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (.CH) 94,334, at 92,181 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); cf
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (requiring board approval in
a merger or consolidation); id. at § 271 (requiring board approval in a sale of
substantially all of the corporation's assets); id. at § 275 (requiring board approval for
dissolution).
9 See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 437, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del.
1985); TWServs., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,181; Andre, supra note 3, at
868-69; Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 947 (1987); Matheson & Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate
Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 407,
409 (1986); Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward a Two-Step Analysis of Directors' Fidelity to
Their Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 373, 373 (1988).
It appears that the use of antitakeover devices will continue to be governed by
the courts because the Securities and Exchange Commission is unlikely to impose
regulations on the use of antitakeover devices. See Matheson & Norberg, supra, at
426-35.
10 See MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 94,179, at 91,634 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); Andre,
supra note 3, at 886-87; Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 475.
The target's directors have a veto power over a tender offer because it is
generally within their power to redeem the antitakeover device. See Moran v.
Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059, 1083 (Del. Ch.), aft'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 475; Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender
Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 120-21 (1986);
Note, supra note 9, at 379-80.
An antitakeover device which is not redeemable by the board of directors would
be enjoined by a court. See Doskocil Co. v. Griggy, No. 10,095, slip op. at 4, 7 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 4, 1988).
11 See Andre, supra note 3, at 889; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1175 (1981);
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the value of their stock. 2 This duty may compel the board to
redeem the antitakeover device and provide the shareholders with
the opportunity to tender their shares.' The surrender of corporate
control, however, may be detrimental to the directors' personal and
economic interests.14 The Delaware Supreme Court addressed this
conflict of interest in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 5 by adopting
an intermediate standard of judicial review for directors' actions in
the tender offer context.'" Unocal upholds the use of an antitakeover
device where the directors demonstrate "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed"'" and the defensive measure is "reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."' 8
The Unocal test has been employed in numerous instances to
judge the validity of antitakeover devices. Yet a consistent judicial
model of the circumstances under which target directors may block a
tender offer based solely on the belief that the tender price is less
than their estimated value of the corporation has not emerged. The
need for consistency is particularly important since opposition to
hostile takeovers is typically based on price considerations.' 9 This
Comment seeks to develop a coherent formulation of the Unocal test
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 247; Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A
Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 377, 382 (1985); Note, supra note 9, at 376-77.
12 See infra notes 61-67 & 172 and accompanying text; cf Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("[When] it became
apparent... that the break-up of the company was inevitable ... [t]he duty of the
board ... changed from the preservation of [the target] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit....
[O]btaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should have been the
central theme guiding director action.").
13 See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, "Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch.)
("[T]here may come a time when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to redeem
the [antitakeover device] and to permit the shareholders to choose [whether or not to
tender their shares]."), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); see also Matheson
& Norberg, supra note 9, at 453 ("The board is still bound to act in the shareholders'
and the corporation's best interest in pursuing possible alternative courses of action,
even where one alternative is a possible change of control.").
14 See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
15 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
16 See infra note 100 (explaining why Unocal is an intermediate standard of
review). Since its pronouncement, Unocal's intermediate test has been widely
accepted as Delaware's standard of judicial review for antitakeover actions. See
Stevenson, The Unocal Standard's Application in Delaware, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 14, 1988, at
22, col. 3. As of the August, 1989 Annual Cumulative Supplement, SHEPARDS
CrrATIONS reported 104 references to the Unocal opinion.
17 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
18 Id.
19 See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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that is both consistent with the Unocal opinion's underlying princi-
ples and reflective of the economic realities facing the target
directors.
In Part I, this Comment will develop a prototypical model of a
noncoercive tender offer to serve as a foundation for the analysis of
the Unocal test.20 This model will help illustrate how a noncoercive
tender offer is obstructed by an antitakeover device. Economic justi-
fications for the use of the antitakeover device will be examined by
discussing the directors' response to the tender offer.
In Part II, this Comment will discuss the fiduciary duties of a
corporation's board of directors and the standards employed by the
Delaware courts to determine compliance with these duties. This
Part concludes that the standards ofjudicial review prior to Unocal-
the business judgment rule2' and the intrinsic fairness test22mare
inappropriate given the directors' conflict of interest in the tender
offer context. As a result, there exists a need for an intermediate
standard ofjudicial review such as that enunciated in Unocal.
In Part III, this Comment will explore the application of the
Unocal test to the noncoercive tender offer model. An examination
of recent case law23 indicates that courts have not applied the Unocal
20 A non-coercive tender offer may be defined as a tender offer whose structure
does not affect the shareholders' ability to rationally evaluate its terms. See Bebchuk,
supra note 9, at 911-13. This is to be contrasted with a coercive tender offer which is
structured to "render mandatory in substance that which is voluntary in form." City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). An example of the prototypical coercive structure is a front-
loaded, two-tiered tender offer. The terms of this tender offer provide that
shareholders who subscribe to the tender will receive the tender offer price, and
those who do not tender will be squeezed-out in a back-end merger at a lower price.
Since there is a substantial difference in the consideration received, shareholders may
be compelled to tender their shares even if they believe that the tender price is
inadequate.
In contrast, an example of a non-coercive structure is one where the
consideration given to non-tendering shareholders in a back-end merger is generally
equal to the tender offer price. Consequently, since the shareholders do not fear
being squeezed out in the second step merger at a lower price, there is no inherent
coercion to tender. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 254.
21 See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986);
Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex.
1988); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); CRTF Corp. v.
Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Samjens Partners I v.
Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401 (Del. May 3, 1989);
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
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test in a uniform manner; the nominal elements of the test have pro-
duced divergent substantive analyses resulting in inconsistent out-
comes. 24 These different applications of the Unocal test are a
consequence of the test's ambiguous language, which has been inter-
preted differently by the lower courts.25
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will propose a reformulation
of the Unocal test which will rectify its present interpretational
dilemma. In particular, this Comment suggests that courts resolve
Unocal's ambiguities by reference to two principles underlying the
Unocal opinion: that directors should act in the shareholders' best
interest, and that courts should employ an intermediate standard of
review in the tender offer context. While these principles indicate
the appropriate interpretation for the first component of the Unocal
test, they also demonstrate that all of the existing formulations of
Unocal's second component are inadequate. Therefore, this Com-
ment proposes a new version of the test that is compatible with Uno-
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd sub nom. Literary Partners v. Time, Inc., (Del.
July 24, 1989) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., [Current Decisions Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch.Jan. 31, 1989); In
re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,181 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 1988); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988);
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988); In re
Fort Howard Shareholders Litig., No. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); Doskocil Co. v.
Griggy, No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 1988); Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552
A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass
Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988); Facet
Enter. v. Prospect Group, No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988); West Point-Pepperell,
Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986); MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings v. Revlon, 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985), aft'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
24 See supra note 23 (noting cases in which the Unocal test has been applied in a
myriad of ways); see also Oesterle, supra note 10, at 118 (noting that in the wake of
Unocal, courts must develop a "sophisticated theory" for determining when tender
offer defenses serve a corporation's best interests, and that this development has
created concern among the officers of Delaware corporations).
25 See infra notes 115-17 & 154-70 and accompanying text (describing the
different applications by courts of the Unocal test resulting from the ambiguity of its
language).
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cal's underlying policies. Under the proposed test, an antitakeover
device is presumed reasonable for a two-month period following a
tender offer if the directors present any evidence that it may maxi-
mize shareholder wealth. Thereafter, the antitakeover device is pre-
sumed reasonable only if the directors demonstrate that there is a
substantial probability of maximizing shareholder wealth through
negotiations with the tender offeror. If the directors are able to sat-
isfy this second prong, they will have a duty to engage in good faith
negotiations with the tender offeror to maximize shareholder wealth
through a merger.
I. THE NONCOERCIVE TENDER OFFER MODEL
This Comment shall examine the application of the Unocal test
to the following prototype of a noncoercive tender offer.26 The tar-
get is a publicly held corporation with an established market for its
stock.2 7 An antitakeover device enables the target in effect to defeat
any unsolicited tender offer not approved by its board.2 ' The tender
26 This Comment shall limit its analysis of the Unocal test to noncoercive tender
offers. Since coercive tender offers prevent shareholders from making a rational
choice as to whether to tender their shares, see supra note 20, the directors have a
legitimate reason for maintaining the antitakeover device. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535
A.2d at 1342; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985);
Kreider, supra note 4, at 136. This Comment focuses on the price considerations
between the tender price and the probability that the directors can achieve a more
valuable alternative, so concerns over the structure of the tender offer are not
relevant. Moreover, an analysis of noncoercive tender offers may be more relevant to
the present takeover climate since many companies have adopted "fair price"
provisions in their charters which effectively require the tender offer to be
noncoercive. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 942; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at
254 n.29; Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense Charter
Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (1978).
27 The Delaware General Corporation Law generally assumes the existence of
an established market where the corporation's stock is either listed on a national
exchange or held by more than 2,000 shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988) (granting appraisal rights to the dissenting
shareholders of a corporation merged into another corporation only if the
consideration received is stock in a corporation that is neither listed on a national
securities exchange nor held by more than 2,000 shareholders).
28 See Kreider, supra note 4, at 125 ("In recent years, many corporations have
adopted antitakeover devices .. "); Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 412 ("200
of Standard & Poor's 500 largest corporations now have some form of antitakeover
provisions.").
It is largely irrelevant whether the antitakeover device is enacted in direct
response to the tender offer or was already in place. In either case, the directors are
making the same essential decision to oppose the takeover bid, albeit by actively
adopting a defensive measure or by passively maintaining an existing one. Hence
[w]hen the [target] board of directors is faced with a tender offer and a
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offeror commences an all cash tender offer for all shares of the target
at a premium above the market price29 and commits itself to engage
in an immediate takeout if the tender is successful. s0 The tender
offer, however, is made contingent upon the target's redemption of
its antitakeover device.
31
request to redeem the [defensive measure] . . . [t]hey will be held to the
same fiduciary standards any other board of directors would be held to in
deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard . . . they
were held to in originally approving the [defensive measure].
Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 954-55, 958). The only notable difference in analysis of prospective versus retro-
spective implementation of an antitakeover device is that courts are less likely to find
a lack of reasonable investigation where the board adopts a defensive measure prior
to the takeover bid, presumably because the directors made their decision less hast-
ily. SeeJohnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 315, 336-37 (1987); Veasey & Mongan, Fiduciary Duties of Directors in Con-
trol Contests, in HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1988, at 449, 504-05 (cit-
ing Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12,
1985)); Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11
DEL.J. CORP. L. 503, 508 (1986).
29 See, e.g., TW Servs., Inc. v. SW1T Acquisition Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,179 n.7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("40% and 50%o
premiums over current stock price are typically encountered in hostile takeover
situations."); Labaton, supra note 2, at Dl, col. 3 ("Recent years have seen an
unparalleled number of takeovers in a climate that has encouraged multi-billion-
dollar bids, often significantly above where a target company's stock had been
trading.").
30 An immediate takeout is a follow-up merger where the tender offeror
acquires all of the non-tendering shares within a few months of the takeover. See
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1709 (1985). Since the prototype tender offer described in this
Comment is noncoercive, the takeout price paid to minority shareholders will be
substantially equal to that paid in the tender offer. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
The tender offeror will be able to squeeze out the minority shareholders
provided: 1) it has acquired a sufficient percentage of the target to satisfy the
shareholder approval requirement for a merger (a mere majority of voting shares), see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1983 & Supp. 1988) (mandating shareholder
approval for a merger), and 2) the follow-up merger complies with § 203 of the
Delaware statute. See id. § 203 (Supp. 1988) (prohibiting certain business
combinations between the corporation and an interested shareholder within three
years of the shareholder's attainment of "interested" status).
The terms of this prototypical noncoercive tender offer (for any and all shares
for cash with an immediate takeout provision) is the least coercive structure possible.
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 254 & n.29; Stevenson, supra note 16, at 24.
31 Unsolicited tender offers are generally made contingent upon several
conditions, one of which is the revocation of any antitakeover devices. See, e.g., TW
Servs., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,177 n.4 (listing conditions of SWT's
tender offer, which include redemption of rights plan); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v.
Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at
90,870 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (listing conditions of Nomad's offer, which include
19891
232 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 138:225
Typically, if the target's board wished to defeat the tender offer,
it would proceed in the following manner.3 2 First, if a majority of the
current board was not independent, the board would appoint a spe-
cial committee composed primarily of outside directors in order to
respond to the tender offer.33 The group of independent directors
would then consult with an investment banker34 to determine
redemption of rights plan); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792
(Del. Ch.) (listing conditions of City Capital's tender offer, which include redemption
of rights plan), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). The prototypical tender
offer in this Comment, however, is not contingent upon any conditions other than
the tender offer's success (that is, the tendering of the desired percentage of
outstanding shares by the shareholders).
32 See generally Streeter, Memo to the Board of Directors Re: Obligations in a Takeover
Situation, 4 CORP. COUNS. Q., July 1988, at 55, 60-63 (describing the procedural
posturing sufficient to demonstrate good faith and due care in defeating a takeover
bid).
33 See Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee - Ensuring Business
Judgment Rule Protection, 43 Bus. LAw. 665, 674 (1988); Veasey, supra note 28, at 510-
11. Outside directors do not hold lucrative management positions, so a majority of
the special committee would have much less of a conflict of interest than would the
full board. See Simpson, supra, at 666-67. The potential for directorial abuse is thus
decreased.
Courts generally extend greater deference to the special committee's decision to
use the antitakeover device. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356
(Del. 1985) ("[Where] a majority of the board favoring the [antitakeover device]
proposal consist[s] of outside independent directors ... [the proof of reasonableness
is] materially enhanced .... "); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 542
A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[A] decision made by an independent board will not
give rise to liability ... if it is made in good faith and the exercise of due care.");
Anderson & Bibi, Defensive Strategies: Recapitalization and Restructuring Transactions, in
HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1988, at 281, 288-89; Simpson, supra, at
667.
Some commentators, however, have questioned the "independence" of outside
directors. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.)
(Cudahy, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1271 (Del. 1989); M.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 144-48 (1976);
see also infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing outside directors'
economic and noneconomic interests in defeating takeover bids).
The power to create a special committee which is vested with many of the powers
of the full board of directors is expressly granted in the Delaware General
Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
34 Consultation with an investment banker regarding the merits of a tender offer
is virtually required by the directors' fiduciary duty of due care. See Streeter, supra
note 32, at 61; Veasey, supra note 28, at 510.
The credibility of investment bankers' studies has been the subject of
controversy. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 710-11
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that investment bankers might not be disinterested since their
compensation may be contingent upon the obstruction of the hostile tender offer);
Southdown Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D. Tex.
1988) ("The opinion of Moore McCormack's investment advisor lacks support by
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whether the tender offer is in the shareholders' best interest.3 5 A
tender offer at a premium over the market price will be in the share-
holders' best interest if it represents the target's "full" value: the
maximum value that the shareholders might be able to obtain.3 6 Any
analysis of the target's "full" value is based upon an estimate of its
potentiality: its possible yet unrealized value. These projections,
however, are necessarily uncertain.3 7 Therefore, the directors' eval-
verifiable facts .... "); Interco, 551 A.2d at 792 (stating that investment banker's "so-
called reference ranges do not purport to be a range of fair value; but just what they
purport to be is (deliberately, one imagines) rather unclear"); Veasey & Mongan,
supra note 28, at 471 ("In Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313 (Del. Ch. Dec.
10, 1985), the court was critical of valuation opinions presented by each side's
investment banker as to the fairness of a merger proposal."); Bartlett, Delaware Courts
Get Tough Toward Investment Bankers, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at DI, col. 1
("Investment bankers are being sharply criticized in the Delaware courts . . . for
giving arbitrary investment opinions about the value of bids. 'The courts are
suspicious and will no longer accept blindly the advice of bankers,' said Chancellor
William T. Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court .. ").
35 See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 448 ("[I]t may be part of
management's duty to actively resist proposals that management does not consider
to be in the best interests of the shareholders.").
36 See Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-98 ("Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may
represent a 'threat' to shareholder interests in the special sense that an active
negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to extract a
higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative
transaction or a modified business plan that will present a more valuable option to
shareholders."); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112
(Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that a tender offer at a "fair" price might not be in
shareholders' best interest if they prefer an alternative developed by the directors).
The central assumption of this view is that the market does not efficiently price
the value of a corporation's stock. See, e.g., Dynamics, 805 F.2d at 717 ("[I]t can be
argued that the value fixed by the market is the value of the marginal share rather
than the sale value of the entire company as a unit."); Paramount Communications v.
Time, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989) ("But just as the Constitution does not enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer's social
statics, neither does the common law of director's duties elevate the single theory of
a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text."), aff'd sub nom.
Literary Partners v. Time, Inc., (Del. July 24, 1989) (available on LEXIS and
WESTLAW); see also Andre, supra note 3, at 871 ("Proponents of the view that the
stock market is not efficient and that certain stocks are undervalued argue that tender
offers merely exploit underpriced stock."); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1987) (noting "the failure of the
financial markets to place a value on the securities of companies that is
commensurate with their underlying assets"); Oesterle, supra note 10, at 124-26
(noting that even if the market prices a company's stock efficiently, its valuation is
subject to error since the market price can only reflect public information while the
managers may possess inside information). But see T. COPELAND & J. WESTON,
FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 361-94 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the
results of empirical research that, to varying degrees, supports the efficient market
hypothesis under certain circumstances).
37 See Fabrikant, Is Paramount Ripe for a Takeover, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1989, at
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uation of the tender offer will focus on the probability that they can
develop an alternative option more valuable than the tender price.
There are four basic options 38 that may yield a greater value
than the tender offer: undertaking an internal restructuring,
3 9
engaging in a Revlon-style auction,40 waiting for a market adjust-
ment,4 1 or negotiating directly with the tender offeror.
4 2
An internal restructuring is a self-initiated reorganization of the
financial structure of a corporation. The most common techniques
are liquidations,43 spin-offs,44 and recapitalizations.45 If the invest-
D6, col. 3 (noting that investment bankers' projections of the true value of a
corporation are "merely estimates"); supra note 34 (discussing the inaccuracy of
some investment bankers' projections).
38 The four listed options are not an all-inclusive list of possible alternatives to
the tender offer. Discussion of other possible options is not particularly relevant for
this Comment's purposes because these other options essentially achieve the same
result and are developed through similar means. The listed options are merely some
of the more currently popular alternatives.
39 See Anderson & Bibi, supra note 33, at 283; Rosenfeld, The Use of Management
LBO's, Leveraged Transactions, and White Knight Strategies in Response to Hostile Takeovers,
in HOSTILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CorrROL 1988, at 11; see also Fabrikant, Adding
Up What Time Might Be Worth, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at D21, col. 4 ("Time's
management has argued that in the long term it could realize and get better values
[through a proposed merger with Warner Communication].").
40 See Dynamics, 805 F.2d at 710; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 260.
41 See Interco, 551 A.2d 787, 793-94; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 260.
42 See, e.g., Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,660, at 98,031-32 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1988) (target negotiates
with hostile bidder); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1984)
(same); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 260 (noting negotiation with
tender offeror as an alternative option).
43 See Lipton, supra note 36, at 33. A liquidation involves the sale of some or all
of the target corporation's assets followed by a distribution of cash to the
shareholders. See Rosenfeld, supra note 39, at 13-15.
44 A spin-off involves the creation of a new corporation (often a subsidiary)
comprised of assets of the parent followed by a distribution to shareholders of the
new company's stock. The effect is that shareholders subsequently own 100%0 of two
independent companies, rather than the original one. This provides the
shareholders with a combined distribution and equity value greater than the tender
offer price. See Anderson & Bibi, supra note 33, at 283, 297.
45 "Recapitalizations involve a reclassification and reallocation of the currently
existing stock of a company. . . . Typically, the public stockholders of the
recapitalized company will receive a combination of cash, debt securities and equity
(preferred and/or common stock) in the newly recapitalized company." Id. at 295; see
also Lin Reects $6.7 Billion McCaw Bid, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1989, at D18, col. 4
(noting that Lin "was considering several options to enhance shareholder value,
including a recapitalization and a special dividend for shareholders").
One of the more common uses of a recapitalization is to achieve a management
led leveraged buy-out. Since this type of transaction, however, involves self-dealing,
see Lederman, Representing a Public Company in a Leveraged Buyout Transaction, in
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ment banker's projected value of a restructuring plan is greater than
the tender offer price, the directors may adopt the restructuring plan
or use the estimated restructuring value as a tool in negotiating with
the tender offeror.
A Revlon-style auction is the act of voluntarily putting the target
corporation "on the block" with the expectation that competitive
bidding will result in a sale price for the stockholders greater than
the initial tender offer.46 Typically, the target's directors will solicit a
"friendly" bidder, known as a "white knight," to compete with the
tender offeror.47 If a competitive bidder materializes, the board
assumes the role of auctioneer and encourages the bidding in order
to obtain the highest price for its shareholders.48
HOSTILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1988, at 110-12, it is reviewed under the
intrinsic fairness test and is not directly addressed by this Comment.
46 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (stating that when the sale of a company becomes inevitable, it is the duty
of the board of directors to maximize the sale price for the stockholders through the
encouragement of competitive bids by all interested parties); Robert M. Bass Group
v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241 (Del. Ch.) (a noncoercive tender offer is a threat "only
in the minimal sense that the [tender offer], although fair, is less than the highest
price that the defendants' financial advisors believed might be obtained if the entire
company were put up for sale"), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. Robert M.
Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); see also Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 929 ("[T]he
target's shareholders might expect that another bidder, who can put the target's
assets to a more valuable use than can the present bidder, will come forward later
with a higher offer."); Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 454 ("It is well
recognized that creating an auction atmosphere may benefit the target
shareholders.").
Technically speaking, a Revlon-style auction may be defined as a transaction
which results in a change of corporate control. See Paramount Communications v.
Time, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989), aff'd sub nom. Literary Partners v. Time, Inc., (Del.July 24, 1989) (available on
LEXIS and WESTLAW). If a true auction occurs, it need not be conducted in any set
manner. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del.
1989) ("Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction according
to some standard formula, only that they observe the significant requirement of
fairness for the purpose of enhancing general shareholder interests.").
47 See Tate & Lyle v. Staley Continental, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764, at 98,587 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988); Matheson & Norberg,
supra note 9, at 454 n.164. The courts have permitted the target to bestow benefits
upon potential or actual white knights provided that such benefits are reasonably
calculated to enhance the bidding. See In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,644-45 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1988); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. at
35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), appeal denied, 547 A.2d 633 (Del. 1988).
48 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Paramount Communications, [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 93,277; see also In re Holly Farms Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,644 (noting that once the target board "determined
that it would sell the corporation ... [it] should have assumed the role of an
1989]
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Alternatively, the corporation may choose to wait for a market
adjustment in its stock price, based on the belief that the market is
currently undervaluing the target but will eventually increase its val-
uation to a price greater than the tender offer.4 9 Typically, the justi-
fication for such a belief rests upon either a discounted cash flow of
the target's projected earnings,
5 0 the break-up value of the target,
51
or inside information regarding the target's business opportuni-
ties.5 2 The directors can simply wait for the expected market adjust-
ment or use this projected market value as a lever in bargaining with
the tender offeror.
Negotiating directly with the tender offeror for a higher price
assumes that the target is worth more than the initial bid to the
tender offeror.51 If this is so, the target board could conceivably
negotiate a merger with the tender offeror for a price up to the
tender offeror's subjective valuation of the target.5 4 Even if the tar-
get directors do not actively negotiate with the tender offeror,
auctioneer and it then became its duty to maximize the sales price... for the benefit
of its shareholders"); Labaton, supra note 2, at Dl, col. 3 ("[The Delaware justices
said that once the sale of a company is inevitable, the directors must act as neutral
auctioneers with the goal of obtaining the highest price.").
49 See Paramount Communications, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,277;
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 262; supra note 36 (noting that the market does
not efficiently price stock).
50 See Fabrikant, Warner Gets Good Price, Analysts Say, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1989,
at A31, col. 6 (noting that Drexel Burnham valued Warner by "using a multiple of
about nine time 1989 cash flow"); Fabrikant, supra note 37, at D6, col. 3 ("Wall Street
analysts come up with their estimates using multiples of operating income from the
[corporation's] various divisions.").
51 "The breakup value is the sum of a company's assets if sold separately."
Fabrikant, supra note 50, at A3 1, col. 6; see also Fabrikant, supra note 39, at D2 1, col. 4
(noting that the break-up value of a corporation "is the yardstick by which Wall
Street determines [its] value").
52 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 262.
53 Some "subjectivist" economic theories suggest that the target may have a
greater value to the tender offeror than to any other party. The Synergistic Gains
Theory attributes the premium over the market price to anticipated synergistic effects
from the combination of the target and tender offeror. See Andre, supra note 3, at 874
("[T]he target [may have] a unique value to the bidder that exceeds its value to the
market generally .. .[due to] gains from synergy [as a] result of greater operating
efficiencies or reduced financial risks."); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 261.
The Inefficient Management Theory "suggests that a premium is paid in a tender
offer because the target's assets will be worth more under the management of the
bidder than they currently are as managed by the target." Andre, supra note 3, at 872
(citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1173).
54 See W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 427-28 (3d ed. 1985).
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obstructing the tender offer and asserting that the tender price is
inadequate may cause the tender offeror to increase its bid.55
If, after assessing the various options, the target's directors
believe that a value greater than the tender price could be obtained
for the shareholders, the board would reject the tender offer as inad-
equate and refuse to redeem the antitakeover device.
5 6
At this point, the dispute reaches the courts. The tender offeror
seeks an injunction to have the antitakeover device removed, assert-
ing that its real purpose is to perpetuate the incumbent manage-
ment.57 To support this contention, the tender offeror produces its
own investment banker's evaluations of the target to demonstrate
that the tender offer is the target shareholders' best possible
option.58 In response, the target's directors claim that the antitake-
over device is necessary to maximize shareholder wealth since the
55 See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Typically, an initial tender offer is regarded as a tentative opening ploy,
subject to revision with respect to its terms and upward price adjustment.");
Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 930 ("[T]he shareholders might expect that rejection of the
present bid would lead the present bidder to make a higher offer."); Tyson Raises Bid
for Holly, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1989, at D4, col. 2 (noting that Tyson Foods raised its
tender offer for Holly Farms from $63.50 to $70 per share eight months after its
initial bid was thwarted by an antitakeover device).
56 See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 710 (7th Cir.
1986) ("[A]fter thoroughly and impartially considering a variety of alternative
methods of maximizing the shareholders' wealth the [directors] . . . adopted the
[antitakeover device] in order to maximize the price at which the company would be
sold."); Andre, supra note 3, at 869 n.21 ("Target management's usual justification
for opposing tender offers is that management has deemed the offer 'grossly
inadequate.' Thus, management adopts defensive tactics to 'protect' its shareholders
.... " (citing Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985))); Matheson &
Norberg, supra note 9, at 438 ("In essence, the board's decision to retain the
corporation's independence, because it deems an offer 'inadequate', has been used
by the courts to justify giving the board a free hand to effect this decision by whatever
means the board believes necessary.").
57 See Andre, supra note 3, at 889 ("Once a tender offer has been rejected or
successfully resisted by target management, it seems inevitable that lawsuits ... will
follow . . . charg[ing] that management is more concerned with entrenching itself
than with maximizing shareholder profits."); see also Paramount Seeks to Bar Time
Directors, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1989, at D18, col. 4 ("Paramount attacked [the
antitakeover device] as 'a deliberate, persistent pattern of entrenchment moves by
management .... ' "); In Media Giants' Takeover Battle, Power of Debt Is Starkly Revealed,
N.Y. Times,June 18, 1989, at Al, col. I (noting the view of some analysts that Time's
management was trying to "preserve itself in the face of the perceived threat of being
taken over").
58 See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071, at 91,013 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988) (tender
offeror claimed its takeover bid "represents the highest price available to [the
target's] shareholders"), rev'd on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
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tender price is less than the value that might be obtained if an alter-
native option is pursued.59 Thus, the question of whether the
antitakeover device is actually promoting the interests of sharehold-
ers reduces to one of whose investment banker is more accurate in
assessing the target's "full" value.60
II. DIRECTOR'S DUTIES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Directors' Fiduciary Duties
Although the board of directors of a Delaware corporation is
charged by the Delaware General Corporation Law61 with managing
the business and affairs of the corporation, it also has a common law
fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders' best interest.62 This fiduci-
ary duty consists of two components: the duty of loyalty and the duty
of due care.63 The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires the directors to
59 See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 413. Target directors making these
arguments face a Catch-22 dilemma. They are claiming that the tender offer is not
equal to the "full" value of the company which they say may be realized through
means other than accepting the tender offer. Yet, by doing so, the directors admit
that the status quo ante-bellum (before the corporate control contest) was not a
maximization of shareholder wealth. Therefore, the directors implicitly confess to
the breach of their fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth. See Oesterle, supra
note 10, at 145.
60 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-800 (Del. Ch.),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); see also Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("Investment bankers support and critique each
side of the controversy over the more productive way to create shareholder value.");
Bartlett, supra note 34, at D1, col. 1 ("[M]ore and more cases require judges to
evaluate competing packages of arcane securities proffered by ... various bidders,
and that has elevated investment opinions to a position of primary importance.").
61 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); see also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d
531, 536 (Del. 1986) ("Under Delaware law the business and affairs of a corporation
are managed by and under the direction of its board of directors."); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) ("The ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation falls on its board
of directors."); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 n.6 (Del.
1985) ("The general grant of power to board of directors is conferred by ...
§ 141 (a), which provides: '(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors
62 See Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1055 (stating the basic principle that "corporate
directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation's
stockholders"); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 ("[T]he fiduciary standards outlined in
Unocal... require the directors to determine the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders ...."); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 ("[Clorporate directors have a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporations' stockholders.").
63 See Polk, 507 A.2d at 536 ("[T]he directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties
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act for corporate purposes rather than in their own self-interest.'
The fiduciary duty of due care requires the directors to have an
informed basis for action.65 Where the directors are found to have
breached either of these duties, a court may hold the directors liable
for any resulting harm to the shareholders; where the directors are
found to have breached the duty of loyalty, recision of the corporate
transaction may result as well. 66 Before the Unocal decision, the Del-
aware courts enforced the directors' fiduciary duties by employing
two distinct standards for review of directors' actions: the business
judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test.67
1. The Business Judgment Rule
Under the business judgment rule, courts extend great defer-
ence to directors' actions. To satisfy this standard ofjudicial review,
directors need only demonstrate that their decision can be "attrib-
uted to any rational business purpose."68  Once directors have
shown this, the business judgment rule affords a "presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company. ' 69 This pre-
sumption cannot be rebutted "unless it is shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based on
perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary
duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being unin-
formed."7 Because each of these elements is difficult to prove,
of loyalty and care to the corporation and its shareholders."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
64 See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.
1987); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510;
Note, supra note 9, at 376.
65 See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73;
Anderson & Bibi, supra note 33, at 285-87.
66 See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 822-25 (1981); Note, supra note 9, at 376.
67 See Oesterle, supra note 10, at 117, 118 n.7.
68 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see also Robert M.
Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch.) ("Under [the business
judgment rule] standard, the transaction is presumed to be valid ... so long as it can
be attributed to any rational business purpose."), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan,
Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("A
hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business
purpose.'" (quoting Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720)).
69 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
70 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
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courts rarely will find a breach of fiduciary duty when directorial
decisions are subject to the business judgment rule.
7
1
There are several justifications for the business judgment rule's
mild review. First, courts lack expertise to make substantive evalua-
tions of business decisions. 72 Second, any evaluation made by the
courts will have the benefit of hindsight, necessarily distorting judi-
cial perception of the situation faced by the directors. 73 Third, "the
rule encourages informed risk taking by directors because it shields
them from personal liability. . ... 7' And fourth, a stricter rule may
deter qualified people from accepting directorships.
75
These justifications for a deferential review of directors' actions,
however, represent only part of the rationale for the business judg-
ment rule. Of equal significance is the fact that the business judg-
ment rule is applicable only to directorial decisions that occur in a
particular context: ordinary business matters.76 While there is no
71 See In re Beatrice Cos. Shareholder Litig., No. 8248, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 16, 1986), aff'd, 552 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1987);
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 328; Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 415,
422; see also In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. at 30
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) ("Rarely will direct evidence of bad faith.., be available.");
Andre, supra note 3, at 889-90 (to overcome the presumptions afforded by the
business judgment rule, "the plaintiff was required to show that the directors acted
improperly or in bad faith. Such an evidentiary burden was not only difficult to
sustain, but courts were loathe to bar application of the business judgment rule even
upon a clear showing of blatant conflicts of interest" (footnote omitted)).
72 SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch.
1988);Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 323 & n.27; Veasey & Mongan, supra note
28, at 460; Note, supra note 9, at 376; Note, False Halo: The Business Judgment Rule in
Corporate Control Contests, 66 TEX. L. REv. 843, 846-47 (1988).
73 SeeJohnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 323 & n.27; Note, supra note 72, at 846.
74 Note, supra note 72, at 846; see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; West Point-Pepperell,
542 A.2d at 780; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 323 & n.27; Veasey & Mongan,
supra note 28, at 460.
75 See Note, supra note 72, at 846. "This justification for the business judgment
rule, however, is not as much a concern today... [since] several states [have] enacted
statutes that permit corporations to limit the liability of their directors for breaches of
fiduciary duties." Id. at 846 n.18; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983) ("A
corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any
person who is or was a director ... against any liability asserted against him and
incurred by him in any such capacity .... ").
76 See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) ("Under Delawaie law the
business and affairs of a corporation are managed by and under the direction of its
board of directors.... Subject to certain well defined limitations, a board enjoys the
protection of the business judgment rule in discharging its responsibilities."
(citations omitted)); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) ("The bedrock
of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is the rule that the
[ordinary] business and affairs of a corporation are managed by and under the
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precise definition of ordinary business matters, courts clearly distin-
guish between business decisions that concern day-to-day operations
of the corporation and decisions which involve self-dealing transac-
tions.77 The relative potential for directorial abuse is the basis for
this distinction. Where the potential for directorial abuse is greater
than that in ordinary business matters, the justifications for a defer-
ential review are less compelling.71 Conversely, in the context of
ordinary business matters, the potential for directorial abuse is mini-
mal and does not outweigh the justifications for a deferential review
of business decisions.
2. The Intrinsic Fairness Test
The greatest potential for directorial abuse occurs in corporate
transactions that involve self-dealing, defined as transactions in
direction of its board."); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989
Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,709 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1989) ("[Tlhis action constitutes an attack upon a decision made by an apparently
disinterested board in the exercise of its statutory power to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation. That being apparently the case, the appropriate format or
structure for judicial review of the action under attack would be provided by the
businessjudgment rule...." (citations omitted)); Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9,
at 449 n.154 ("The business judgment rule has its limits in all contexts."); Veasey,
supra note 28, at 505 ("These decisions are often 'enterprise' or operational issues
('shall we buy a new truck?' or 'shall we give Mary a raise?')."); Note, Corporate
Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87
MICH. L. REV. 276, 281 (1988) ("The traditional version of the business judgment
rule covers operational decisions made by directors in the day-to-day conduct of the
corporation's affairs .... ).
77 See RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
91,710 ("The sort of 'interest' that qualifies to disarm a board at the outset of the
benefits of a business judgment approach is a financial interest in the transaction
adverse to that of the corporation or its shareholders."); Robert M. Bass Group v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch.) ("[T]he [judicial] standard governing the
propriety of [a corporate] transaction will depend upon the context or setting in
which it arises."), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group,
548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d
585, 602 (Del. Ch.) (stating that the business judgment rule is applicable "where no
self-dealing is shown"), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Go.,
419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980) ("The business judgment rule is a presumption
that a rational business decision of the.., directors of a corporation is proper unless
there exists facts which remove the decision from the protection of the rule -such as
self-dealing, conflict of interest, etc.").
78 See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he business
judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest."), appeal
dismissed, 746 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1984); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) ("[Tjhis judicial reluctance to assess the merits of a
business decision ends in the face of illicit manipulation of a board's deliberative
processes by self-interested corporate fiduciaries.").
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which "directors . . . are on both sides." 79 In this situation, the
transaction lacks the objective indicia of an arm's-length exchange,
enabling directors to enrich themselves at the shareholders'
expense.80 As a result, Delaware courts do not use the business
judgment rule and instead apply a stricter form of judicial review
known as the intrinsic fairness test." This test, codified in the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law,82 requires that courts examine the
substantive merits of the corporate transaction and uphold it only if
the directors can demonstrate that the transaction was fair in its
entirety to the corporation:
83
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approval[] of the directors . . .w[as]
obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and
financial considerations of the proposed [transaction], including all
relevant factors .... 84
Thus, the intrinsic fairness test essentially requires courts to make
their own evaluation of the directors' action and to substitute their
judgment for that of the directors.
B. The Tender Offer Dilemma
The tender offer context presents an anomalous situation for
the courts' use of the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fair-
ness test. An unsolicited tender offer enhances the potential for
directorial abuse because the surrender of corporate control may be
79 Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
710 (Del. 1983)).
80 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7, 710; see also RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,710 n.12 (a self-dealing transaction
occurs "when a financially interested party sets the terms of a transaction and
compels its effectuation" (citations omitted)).
81 See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Robert M.
Bass Group, 552 A.2d. at 1239; Tate & Lyle v. Staley Continental, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764, at'98,585 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988).
82 "No contract or transaction between a corporation and I or more of its
directors.., shall be void or voidable.., if... [t]he contract or transaction is fair as
to the corporation as of the time it is authorized ..... DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144(a)(3) (1983).
83 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Robert M. Bass Group, 552 A.2d at 1239; Tate &
Lyle, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,585; AC
Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986); Note,
supra note 9, at 376.
84 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
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detrimental to the directors' self-interest.8 5 In a transfer of corpo-
rate control, all directors face the prospect of losing their director-
ships.8 6 More importantly, inside directors may lose their lucrative
management positions,87 and outside directors may lose benefits
associated with their directorship duties and their relationship to the
inside directors.8 8 Hence, the context of a corporate control contest
presents a greater potential for directorial abuse than the ordinary
business context of the business judgment rule. 9 As a result, there
is heightened concern over directorial abuse that vitiates the justifi-
cations for the business judgment rule's deferential review.
90
At the same time, directors' self-interest in a corporate control
transaction is not equivalent to that in a self-dealing transaction.
While directors may benefit if a tender offer is prevented, they do
not stand on both sides of the transaction, as they would in a self-
dealing situation.91 Hence, there is little need for the intrinsic fair-
85 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 263.
86 See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1986);
Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D. Tex.
1988);Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 324; Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive
Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP.
L. 337, 343-44 (1983); Veasey, supra note 28, at 508; Note, supra note 9, at 377.
87 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 247-48; Johnson & Siegel, supra note
28, at 324-25; Kreider, supra note 4, at 135; Oesterle, supra note 10, at 130; see also
Andre, supra note 3, at 877 n.75 ("A takeover is a traumatic event for target
management. In its aftermath, dismissals are almost inevitable, and in some cases
they decimate the executive staff of the target." (quoting Coffee, Regulating the Market
for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1238 (1984))).
88 See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 300-01 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Prentice, supra note 86, at
343; cf. supra note 33 (noting that outside directors may have the same interests as
inside directors).
89 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 247; cf. Kreider, supra note 4, at 123
("[T]he conflict of interest that always exists in these circumstances by virtue of the
very purpose of the tender offer, to wrest control of the corporation from its
incumbent management, demands that courts not give unfettered discretion to
management in opposing such offers."). Compare supra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text (noting minimal potential for directorial abuse in ordinary
business matters when the business judgment rule is applied) with supra notes 85-88
and accompanying text (noting directors' economic and non-economic interests
involved in corporate control contests).
90 See Andre, supra note 3, at 890; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 324;
Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 422; Note, supra note 9, at 374; Note, Tender
Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 623-24
(1983).
91 See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988) ("The
board's enactment of the [antitakeover device] . . . does not make the board
'interested[]'...."). But see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 248 ("[R]esponding
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ness test's strict scrutiny of the substantive aspects of the directors'
decision to combat a takeover attempt.9 2 Thus, neither the business
judgment rule nor the intrinsic fairness test provides a suitable stan-
dard for judicial review of the use of antitakeover devices.9"
In essence, the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness
test simply balance two factors: the potential for directorial abuse
and the desirability of judicial review of the substantive merits of
directors' decisions.9 4 The justifications against judicial review of
directors' decisions are equally applicable in all contexts. 95 Where
the potential for directorial abuse is minimal, as in ordinary business
matters, these justifications outweigh concerns that the judicial
review is needed to protect shareholders from their directors.
9 6
Where the potential for directorial abuse is great, however, as in self-
dealing transactions, concerns over shareholder interests outweigh
the justifications against judicial review. 97 Therefore, where the con-
text of the directors' action falls between the paradigmatic extremes
envisioned by each test, an intermediate level of judicial review is
optimal.98
C. Unocal's Intermediate Standard of Review
In the landmark case Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 99 the Del-
aware Supreme Court adopted an intermediate level of review for
to a hostile takeover is an interested transaction that calls for judicial review under
the intrinsic fairness test. Yet, invoking this rigorous standard would simply
condemn most defensive tactics without any justification beyond the standard
itself.").
92 See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del.
1987) (noting that the use of an antitakeover device does not require the application
of the intrinsic fairness test).
93 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1198; Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 2, at 247; Kreider, supra note 4, at 135; Prentice, supra note 86, at 344-46.
94 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for the
business judgment rule's deferential standard of review). It seems unlikely that the
judiciary's expertise in evaluating corporate decisions will vary with the context of
any particular decision.
96 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the
business judgment rule's deferential review).
97 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the
intrinsic fairness test's strict scrutiny of directors' decisions).
98 See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458,473 (D. Del. 1988) ("The role
of the Court in assessing the decisions made by directors in the hostile tender offer
context is an intricate composite of deference to the business expertise of the
directors and close scrutiny of incumbent management decisions.").
99 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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directorial actions designed to defeat takeover attempts.100 The
court recognized that a target's directors are faced with an inherent
conflict of interest in corporate control contests.'01 Hence, any
action that prevents the takeover bid raises "the omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
[in] those of the corporation and its shareholders." 10 2 While noting
that the business judgment rule still applied to directors' action in
the tender offer context, the Unocal, court imposed an "enhanced
duty.., before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred." 10 3 Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the application of
the intrinsic fairness test to this context. At the same time, however,
the imposition of an "enhanced duty" on the board of directors cre-
ated a standard of review more demanding than the business judg-
ment rule.
This "enhanced duty," commonly known as the Unocal test,
requires directors to demonstrate that their decision to use an
antitakeover device to defeat the tender offer has satisfied two condi-
tions. The first condition, hereinafter referred to as Unocal 1,
demands that "directors ... show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed." 104 The court stated that Unocal 1 is satisfied if the board
shows "'good faith and reasonable investigation'."' 1 5 Moreover,
the court asserted that such proof would be "materially enhanced...
100 The Unocal standard has been referred to as an intermediate review because
it is not as demanding as the intrinsic fairness test, although it is stricter than the
business judgment rule. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 248; see also MAI
Basic Four, Inc. v. v. Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,179, at 91,633-34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) ("A higher duty [than
the business judgment rule] is imposed on a board, however, in connection with the
adoption or implementation of anti-takeover measures."); City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.) (noting that Unocal "created a new
intermediate form of judicial review to be employed when a transaction is neither
self-dealing nor wholly disinterested"), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988);
Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch.) ("A third,
intermediate, standard [of review] applies to ... the context of [directorial action that
obstructs] a pending takeover bid .... ), appeal dismissed sub noma. MacMillan, Inc. v.
Robert M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("[The Delaware Supreme Court
recognized in Unocal . . . that where a board takes action designed to defeat a
threatened change in control of the company, a more flexible, intermediate form of
judicial review is appropriate.").
101 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
102 Id. at 954.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 955 (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)).
105 Id. (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555).
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by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside
independent directors."'
10 6
The second condition, hereinafter referred to as Unocal 2,
requires that the "defensive measure.., be reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."' 0 7 In a much quoted passage, the Unocal court
stated that "[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion to
defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available."'
08
The court stated that the reasonableness test "entails an analysis...
of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise." ''"9 Moreover, the Court specified that appropriate con-
cerns "may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and tim-
ing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies'
other than shareholders.. ., the risk of nonconsummation, and the
quality of securities being offered in the exchange.""
0
III. UNOCAL As APPLIED TO THE NONCOERCIVE TENDER OFFER
A. Unocal 1: Danger to Corporate Policy and Effectiveness
In applying the Unocal test to a noncoercive tender offer, the first
issue a court must address is whether the target's board has satisfied
Unocal 1 in employing the antitakeover device. The Unocal court's
articulation of this requirement,"' however, contains several ambi-
guities that have led to its inconsistent application by the lower
courts.
1. Good Faith and Reasonable Investigation
In stating that Unocal I is satisfied .by a showing of "good faith
and reasonable investigation," the Unocal opinion did not make clear
106 Id. A special committee composed of outside directors would meet the
criterion of an independent board. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (stating
that a special litigation committee of outside directors would have fewer conflicts of
interest than a full board).
107 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Unocal 2's reasonableness test has sometimes been
referred to as the "proportionality" test. See Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack
Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595, 600-01 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Grand Metro. PLC v.
Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco,
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 2, at 248.
108 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
109 Id.
110 Id. (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors'
Responsibilities: An Update, at 7 (Dec. 8, 1983) (presented at ABA National Institute
on the Dynamics of Corporate Control)).
I I I See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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whether this latter demonstration is intended to supersede the actual
language of the Unocal 1 test, which requires "reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed."" 2 This distinction is significant because the two standards
are not necessarily congruent. Since "reasonable grounds for believ-
ing" implies a reasonable investigation, the facial language of Unocal
I cannot be met without the use of good faith and reasonable investi-
gation. 113 The converse, however, is not necessarily true. It is possi-
ble for a board to act in good faith and employ a reasonable
investigation and still not have "reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.""' 4 The
distinction lies in the object of the reasonable investigation; while the
facial language of Unocal 1 demands the reasonable investigation of
"a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness," the mere demon-
stration of "good faith and reasonable investigation" lacks a defini-
tive object.
Because of this ambiguity, the lower courts have not agreed
which standard satisfies Unocal 1. Most courts have taken the posi-
tion that the facial language of Unocal I is the actual test and that the
demonstration of "good faith and reasonable investigation" serves
merely as a predicate to the type of investigation required." 5 Some
112 Unoca4 493 A.2d at 955.
113 Directors are already obligated to exercise good faith and conduct a
reasonable investigation by the business judgment rule. See supra text accompanying
notes 68-69.
114 See, e.g., infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (noting that the court in
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), upheld the use of an antitakeover device under the business judgment rule
despite the lack of evidence concerning the threat the tender offer posed to the value
of the target).
I 5 See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-
42 (Del. 1987) (discussing factors which led directors to reasonably believe that the
tender offer posed a threat); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (requiring
"reasonable grounds for a justifiable belief by the directors that there was a threat"
despite a "primafacie showing of good faith and reasonable investigation"); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986)
(discussing factors that led directors reasonably to believe that the tender offer posed
a threat); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (noting
reasonable grounds for board's perception of the threat to the target); Grand Metro.
PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1059-60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding no threat to
"corporate policy and effectiveness" despite demonstration of "good faith and
reasonable investigation"); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco , Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-
99 (Del. Ch.) (noting board's reasonable investigation into inadequacy of tender
price), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v.
Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at
90,871 (Del: Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (finding directors' "concern about general
conditions in the merger and acquisition market" and the "specific threat from
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248 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:225
other courts have ruled that Unocal 1 may be satisfied simply by dem-
onstrating good faith and reasonable investigation into a perceived
threat; no showing of actual danger to corporate policy or effective-
ness is necessary."I6 In addition, these courts have held that the
presence of an independent board majority shifts the burden of
proof from the directors to the tender offeror.
11 7
2. Corporate Policy and Effectiveness and Shareholder Interests
Even when a court does employ the facial language of Unocal 1, a
serious ambiguity remains in that the Unocal opinion did not provide
a definition of what constitutes a "danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness.""'  Consequently, the lower courts have been
required to interpret this language themselves. Essentially, this task
involves two related questions: 1) Does the tender offer affect "cor-
porate policy and effectiveness"?; and 2) When will this effect be
detrimental?
Whether a noncoercive tender offer affects "corporate policy
and effectiveness" devolves into the question of whether "corporate
policy and effectiveness" includes shareholder interests. It is gener-
ally accepted that a noncoercive tender offer only affects shareholder
Nomad's Schedule 13D filing" to constitute reasonable grounds to believe that there
was a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness).
116 See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474 (D. Del. 1988); CRTF
Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Robert M.
Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
MacMillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Tate & Lyle v.
Staley Continental, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764,
at 98,585 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988).
117 See, e.g., Polk, 507 A.2d at 537 ("[T]he presence of the 10 outside directors
[out of 13] . . . constitute[d] a prima facie showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation. . . . [T]he plaintiffs thus bore a heavy burden of overcoming the
presumptions thus attaching to the board's decisions."); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v.
Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,179, at 91,634 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) ("[W]here a majority of a board (6 out of
7) favoring the takeover defenses consisted of disinterested directors, the burden of
persuasion falls upon the plaintiff to show a breach of the directors' fiduciary
duties.").
118 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 258-59. Unocal held that a coercive,
two-tiered tender offer by a known greenmailer was a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del.
1985). This result follows from the fact that a successful greenmail attempt will
deplete the corporation's assets, thereby affecting the corporation's ability to conduct
its business operations. This example, however, sheds little light on what generally
constitutes a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, and, more specifically,
whether an unsolicited tender offer constitutes such a danger.
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interests.1 19 This conclusion follows from the fact that a tender
offer, in itself, will only change the actual ownership of the corpora-
tion; it does not in any way directly affect the corporation's ability to
conduct its business activities." ° On the other hand, "corporate
policy and effectiveness" literally seems to relate only to corporate
operations; that is, the corporation's ability to conduct its current
business activities.1 2 1 Hence, this category would not include share-
holder interests. This literal definition, however, implies that the
Unocal test does not permit directors to use antitakeover devices to
act in the best interests of their shareholders, 2 2 their primary fiduci-
ary duty.
Faced with this apparent inconsistency between the literal word-
ing of the Unocal test and its underlying policy considerations,
1 21
courts have split as to whether shareholder interests affected by non-
coercive tender offers fall within the scope of Unocal l's "corporate
policy and effectiveness" category. Most courts have held that "cor-
porate policy and effectiveness" does encompass shareholder inter-
ests. 124 This interpretation of "corporate policy and effectiveness"
119 See, e.g., Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1056 (stating that the noncoercive tender
offer is not "a danger to policy or effectiveness of the Pillsbury corporation (that is, the
company as company).... Whatever danger there is relates solely to shareholders and
that concerns price only."); Interco, 551 A.2d at 797 ("[I]n the special case of a tender
offer for all shares, the threat posed, if any, is not importantly to corporate policies
(as may well be the case in a stock buy-back case such as Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548 (Del. 1964) or a partial tender offer case such as Unocal itself), but rather the
threat, if any, is most directly to shareholder interests.").
120 While the change in ownership may eventually result in a change in the
corporation's business operations (such as if the new owner liquidates or
recapitalizes), concerns of this kind are not relevant to the considerations of directors
as agents for current shareholders.
121 See Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1056. Although the distinction between the
efficacy of the corporate enterprise and the shareholders' interest in stock prices
appears to follow from a literal reading of "corporate policy and effectiveness," this
result is somewhat illogical. The concern of directors should not vary between the
shareholders' interest in actual corporate operations and the shareholders' interest in
the exchange value of their stock.
122 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
123 See AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del.
Ch. 1986) (recognizing inconsistency and replacing Unocal I's literal test with a test
based upon policy considerations). But see Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1058-59 ("In the
principal, if not in all, Delaware cases validating use of the [Poison] Pill, it is apparent
that the purpose thereof was to create a 'defense' against hostile, coercive acquisition
techniques. . . . It would be ironic, indeed, if those cases and the shareholder-
protective principle which they created were now ... applied against (a noncoercive
tender offer which] ... pose[s] no threat of any kind to the corporate enterprise.").
124 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 181
(Del. 1986) ("These standards [outlined in Unocal] require the directors to determine
the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders .... "); Nomad Acquisition
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provides that the directors' use of an antitakeover device will satisfy
Unocal 1 if the tender offer presents a danger to shareholder
interests.
Other courts have held that shareholder interests are not liter-
ally included within "corporate policy and effectiveness."' 2 5 Under
this reading, a noncoercive tender offer will not pose a danger to
"corporate policy and effectiveness," and the directors' use of an
antitakeover device can never satisfy the Unocal 1 test.
Still other courts have simply dispensed with analyzing a nonco-
ercive tender offer's effect on shareholder interests in terms of Unocal
I's "corporate policy and effectiveness." There appear to be two
variations on this approach. In the first variation, the Delaware chan-
cery court in AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 1 26 recognized
that "[t]here is no evidence that the [noncoercive tender] offer...
threatens injury to... the [corporate] enterprise. ' 127 Nevertheless,
the court held that Unocal 1 was satisfied despite that test's required
showing of a "danger to corporate policy and effectiveness." With-
out actually questioning the Unocal test, the court "reinterpreted"
Unocal 1 by stating that it is "simply a particularization of the more
general requirement that a corporate purpose, not one personal to
the directors, must be served by the [antitakeover device]."' 1 28 Thus,
if the directors' justification for the antitakeover device was to pro-
mote shareholder interests, this corporate purpose would satisfy
Unocal 1. The AC Acquisitions approach was subsequently followed in
Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Industries 129 In Samjens, a federal court
applying Delaware law similarly "reinterpreted" Unocal 1 to require
that "there ... be a basis for the board to have concluded that the
defensive measure served a proper corporate purpose."'1 30 By sub-
stituting AC Acquisitions' criterion of "valid corporate purpose" for
Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $
94,040, at 90,872 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (approving directors' decision to adopt
rights plan "as a means of protecting Damon's shareholders").
125 See, e.g., Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1056 ("The board must show that it had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
would exist if the [Poison] Pill were redeemed and shareholder choice permitted....
I conclude that no showing has been made that there would be a danger to policy or
effectiveness of the Pillsbury corporation . . . if the Rights were redeemed and/or if
Grand Met succeeds in its Tender Offer. Whatever danger there is relates solely to
shareholders .... ").
126 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
127 Id. at 112.
128 Id.
129 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
130 Id. at 626.
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Unocal I's requirement of "a danger to corporate policy and effec-
tiveness," the Samlens court found that the protection of shareholder
interests was sufficient to satisfy Unocal 1. 13
The second variation more openly disregards the actual lan-
guage of Unocal I and was recently enunciated in City Capital Associates
v. Interco, Inc. 132 The chancery court recognized that "in the special
case of a [noncoercive tender offer], the threat posed, if any, is not
importantly to corporate policies ... but rather the threat, if any, is
most directly to shareholder interests."' 3 3 Consequently, the court
held that the directors' use of an antitakeover device can satisfy Uno-
cal 1, even though a noncoercive tender offer does not affect corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness, so long as the board is protecting
shareholder interests.1 34 The Interco approach differs from that of
AC Acquisitions and Samjens in that Interco requires that the antitake-
over device protect shareholder interests whereas AC Acquisitions and
Samjens require that the antitakeover device serve a valid corporate
purpose.1
3 5
3. Danger from Noncoercive Tender Offers
Courts which read Unocal I's category of "corporate policy and
effectiveness" to include shareholder interests receive no guidance
from the Unocal opinion as to when a belief that a noncoercive tender
offer presents a danger to such interests would be reasonable.' 3 6 A
noncoercive tender offer threatens shareholder interests to the
extent that the tender price is less than the target's "full" value in an
alternative transaction. 1' As noted above, there are four basic types
131 See id.
132 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
133 Id. at 797.
134 See id. at 797-98 ("We have held that a board is not required simply by
reason of the existence of a noncoercive offer to redeem outstanding poison pill
rights.").
135 Compare id. at 796-99 (stating that the threat to shareholder interests posed
by noncoercive tender offer can satisfy Unocal 1) with AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 112
(stating that a "valid corporate purpose" underlying the defensive maneuver can
satisfy Unocal 1) and Samjens Partners 1, 663 F. Supp. at 626 (stating that a defensive
measure must serve a "proper corporate purpose").
136 Even though noncoercive tender offers affect shareholder interests, it does
not necessarily follow that this effect is detrimental. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 2, at 258-60.
137 See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988)
("[Tihe inadequacy of the offering price does present a threat to the company and its
stockholders."); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch.
1988) ("Whatever danger there is relates solely to shareholders and that concerns
price only."); Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241 (Del. Ch.) ("The
1989]
252 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:225
of alternative 'options that may yield this "full" value: undertaking an
internal restructuring, engaging in a Revlon-style auction, simply
waiting for a market adjustment, or negotiating directly with the
tender offeror.' 38 Since each of these options involves an estimation
of a potentiality, any measure of "full" value necessarily contains an
element of uncertainty as to its realization.1 39 Thus, a court must
determine whether the possibility of realizing a "full" value greater
than the tender price could have led the directors to reasonably
believe that the tender offer presented a danger to shareholder
interests.
Despite the relevance of the probability of realizing "full" value
to the reasonableness of the directors' belief, most courts have not
directly addressed this issue in their Unocal 1 analysis.' 40 However,
some courts have dismissed valuations where the investment banker
was not impartial or where the estimates were based upon pie-in-the-
Court thus concludes that if the [noncoercive] offers posed a cognizable, reasonably
perceived threat, it was only in the minimal sense that the [tender price], although
fair, is less than the highest price that the defendants' financial advisors believed
might be obtained [through alternative means]."), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan,
Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); supra note 36 and
accompanying text (noting that a noncoercive tender offer will be in the
shareholders' best interest only where it represents the target's "full" value).
A tender offer at a price lower than the target's "full" value, however, is not a
threat unless there is a probability that the target's shareholders will tender their
shares. In other words, the tender offer is a threat if the directors are correct in their
valuation of the target and the shareholders do not believe the directors. See Interco,
551 A.2d at 798; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 259-60.
138 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 37 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 152-
53.
140 See BNS, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 473-75; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,179, at 91,634 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 94,040, at 90,871-72 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988);
Doskocil Co. v. Griggy, No. 10,095, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 1988); Tate & Lyle
v. Staley Continental, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,764, at 98,585 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988).
One suspects that the courts' aversion to assessing the reasonableness of the
directors' belief that the tender offer poses a danger to shareholder interests is due to
the similarity of this analysis to the reasonableness test in Unocal 2. While these two
evaluations are alike in some respects, they are not identical. In Unocal 1, the
reasonableness of the directors' belief only focuses upon the probability that the
target's "full" value may be greater than the tender offer price. The Unocal 2
reasonableness test, on the other hand, examines whether the antitakeover device is
in the shareholders' best interests. As such, Unocal 2 requires an analysis not only of
the probability of a "full" value greater than the tender price but also the probability
that the tender offer may be withdrawn or reduced in value. Cf infra notes 143-50
and accompanying text (discussing elements of Unocal 2's reasonableness test).
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sky projections. 4 1 Other courts have found valuations suspect
where a "reasonable" period of time had elapsed since the tender
offer and the directors had not yet realized the "full" value.
14 2
B. Unocal 2: Reasonable in Relation to Threat Posed
Once a court has found that the directors have satisfied the
requirements of Unocal 1, it will then proceed to the second element
of the Unocal test. This element requires the court to decide whether
the enactment or maintenance of an antitakeover device is "reason-
able in relation to the threat posed."' 4 3 As noted above, the Unocal
court stated that "[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion
to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available." 1
44
Since all antitakeover devices can effectively thwart tender offers,'
45
the nature of the perceived threat alone determines whether the
device is Draconian. 1
46
The perceived threat from a tender offer may be defined in
terms of the relationship between the tender price, the probability of
realizing the "full" value of the target, and the probability that the
target will be worth less than the tender price if the tender offer is
defeated.' 47 If the tender offer is given the opportunity to succeed,
shareholders may not obtain the "full" value for their stock. As a
result, the shareholders will lose the difference between the "full"
value and the tender price.' 41 However, if the antitakeover device
141 See supra note 34.
142 See, e.g., Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595,
602-03 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (noting that since the company had beyond a reasonable
time to consider and respond to a tender offer, "the company appears to be for sale
only on terms that are acceptable to management but that will not necessarily benefit
the stockholders").
143 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
144 Id.
145 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Paramount Communications
v. Time, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989) ("[Elffectuation of the Warner merger may practically [negatively] impact
the likelihood of a successful takeover of the . . .company .... "), aff'd sub nom.
Literary Partners v. Time, Inc. (Del. July 24, 1989) (available on LEXIS and
WESTLAW).
146 See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 461 ("[A] takeover defense may
not be voided merely because of its effectiveness ....").
147 See supra note 137 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note
139.
148 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that a tender offer at a
premium above the market price may not be in the shareholders' best interest); supra
note 137 and accompanying text (noting that a tender offer threatens shareholder
interests to the extent that the tender price is less than the target's full value).
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prevents the tender offer, the shareholders are denied the opportu-
nity to tender their shares at a premium above the market price. If
the directors are unable to realize the "full" value and the tender
offer is subsequently withdrawn or reduced in value, the sharehold-
ers will lose the difference between the original tender price and the
subsequent value of the target's stock.O4
Thus, the reasonableness test requires a court to engage in a
"calculus" of harms: a factual determination of what course of
action is in the shareholders' best interests.' 50 Set forth in terms of
an equation, an antitakeover device is in the shareholders' best inter-
ests if
(FV - TP)(pFV) - (TP - SV)(pSV) > 0
where "FV" is a "full" value greater than the tender price, "TP" is
the tender price, "pFV" is the probability of realizing this "full"
value if the antitakeover device is maintained, "SV" is the subse-
quent value of the target's stock if the directors have not realized the
"full" value and the tender offer is withdrawn or revised downwards,
and "pSV" is the probability that SV shall occur. The only factor in
149 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,265 ("[lt is very unlikely that the market price of Time stock immediately
following consummation of the now planned two-stage Warner transaction will equal
the initial $175 price offered by Paramount."); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting potential loss to shareholders "if the
Pill remains in place and Grand Met's offer is withdrawn"); Fabrikant, supra note 39,
at D21, col. 4 ("[Ainalysts have said that if Time succeeds in fighting off [the
Paramount] bid... Time's stock could fall initially to about $140 a share [from the
$175 a share offered by Paramount]."); MAI Basic Lowers Bid for Prime Computer, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1989, at D4, col. 1 (noting that MAI Basic Four lowered its bid from
$20 per share to $18 per share six months after its initial tender offer was obstructed
by an antitakeover device); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 264 ("[W]hen
first offers are defeated and no second offer follows, share prices for target firms
eventually sink back to their pre-offer levels and thus inflict heavy opportunity costs
on target shareholders."); Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientfic Evidence, I1 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 38 (1983) ("Currently available evidence
suggests that managerial opposition to a takeover does not reduce shareholder
wealth unless the resistance eliminates potential takeover bids.").
150 See, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (Del. Ch.
1988) ("A reasonable response, then, would be to develop a more valuable economic
alternative [to the tender offer]."), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan, Inc., v. Robert
M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Veasey, supra note 28, at 512 ("[D]ecisions
will be examined for 'reasonableness' - a concept which implies an objective
determination by the court."); Note, supra note 76, at 287 ("The reasonableness
prong allows a court to strike down defensive tactics where the potential harmful
effects of the tactics outweigh the threat identified by the board."(footnote omitted)).
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the reasonableness equation which is precisely known is TP; the
value of the other quantities may only be approximated. 5 '
Unocal 2's reasonableness test suffers from a significant interpre-
tational dilemma. The Unocal court did not indicate the degree of
scrutiny a court should use in analyzing the reasonableness of an
antitakeover device. 152 In particular, courts have been given no gui-
dance on how to estimate the reasonableness equation's unknown
quantities. A court's dilemma is particularly acute in the noncoercive
tender offer model because the target's and the tender offeror's
investment bankers typically produce conflicting estimates of the
unknown factors. 153
151 See supra note 37.
152 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 253 (noting that Unocal
contemplates a form of substantive review by a court, but leaves unanswered the
rigor with which the standard is to be applied).
153 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. A second ambiguity in Unocal
2 is whether the noncoercive tender offer's effect on shareholder interests constitutes
a "threat posed." The Unocal opinion created considerable confusion by failing to
describe this term in the language of "danger to corporate policy and effectiveness"
used in Unocal 1. Compare supra text accompanying note 104 (Unocal 1 uses "danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness") with supra text accompanying note 107 (Unocal
2 uses "threat posed"). As a result, one could infer that the two are not equivalent.
An examination of the Unocal court's description of the Unocal 2 test does not
resolve this ambiguity. Unocal 2 requires an "analysis by the directors of the nature
of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This modifies "threat" in two
respects: 1) the threat relates to the nature of the takeover bid, and 2) the object of
the threat is the "corporate enterprise." Id. The nature of the takeover bid appears
to refer to the tender offer's structure and the consideration proposed. This reading
finds clear support in three of the court's stated examples of directorial concern: the
inadequacy of price, the nature and timing of the tender offer, and the quality of the
securities offered. See id. Since these considerations relate primarily to shareholder
interests, one could argue that Unocal 2's "threat posed" may be broader than Unocal
I's "corporate policy and effectiveness" depending upon how this latter term had
been defined by the court. On the other hand, the reference to the "corporate
enterprise" as the object of the "threat posed" appears sufficiently similar to Unocal
I's category of "corporate policy and effectiveness" that one may equate the two. As
a consequence, the lower courts have not unanimously defined "threat posed" to
include the noncoercive tender offer's effect on shareholder interests.
Some courts have defined "threat posed" as encompassing any threat to any
corporate interest that includes shareholder interests. See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473, 475 (D. Del. 1988) (stating that "inadequacy of the
offering price does present a threat to the company and its stockholders[,]" thus
implying that the definition of "threat" includes more than mere threats to the
corporate enterprise, and creating suspicion that a threat of any kind will satisfy
Unocal 2); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (interpreting "threat" to
include danger to the interests of "the corporation and its stockholders"); AC
Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(interpreting "threat" to include "injury to shareholders or to the enterprise").
Other courts have defined "threat posed" in terms of Unocal I's "danger to
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The ambiguity in assessing an antitakeover device's reasonable-
ness has resulted in lower courts applying different degrees of sub-
stantive analysis. Some courts, in assessing the reasonableness of an
antitakeover device, have engaged in a significant substantive review
of whether the antitakeover device is in the shareholders' best inter-
ests. For instance, in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 154Judge
Posner remanded the district court's order approving an antitake-
over device on the ground that the record did not sufficiently
demonstrate the device's reasonableness.' 5 5 Devoting nine pages to
an examination of the evidence on record, Judge Posner questioned
why the antitakeover device contained its particular triggering per-
centage and triggering price.1 5 6 Notwithstanding the testimony of a
"qualified financial expert" and an investment banker, Judge Posner
held that the record created a serious doubt as to whether CTS had
satisfied the requirement that "the reservation price.., be reason-
ably related to the value of the corporation."' 7 Because Judge
Posner was purporting to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of
appellate review,'5 8 his opinion appears to indicate that an antitake-
over device cannot be reasonable unless the directors can demon-
strate with certainty that it will maximize shareholder wealth.
corporate policy and effectiveness." Those cases that have defined Unocal 2's
"threat" in terms of the Unocal I analysis do not share a common definition of threat
because of the different interpretation used in Unocal 1. Therefore, some courts have
held that Unocal 2's concept of threat includes threats to shareholder interests. See,
e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(stating that the Unocal 2 "threat" includes any threat to shareholder interests).
Other courts, however, have held that "threat posed" does not include shareholder
interests. See, e.g., Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del. Ch.
1988) ("Is the Board's defensive measure . . . 'reasonable in relation to the threat
posed?'. . . [T]he only 'threat posed' here is to shareholder value-nothing
whatsoever affects the corporate entity or any other constituency." (quoting Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955)).
This difference in interpretation, however, will not affect the analysis under the
noncoercive tender offer model. As stated above, a noncoercive tender offer poses a
threat only to shareholder interests. As such, the interpretation of "threat" under
Unocal 2, which encompasses any threat to any corporate interest, will include threats
to shareholder interests. Similarly, the interpretation of Unocal 2's threat, which is
equated with Unocal l's category of "corporate policy and effectiveness," will also
include threats to shareholder interests if the court has already defined this category
to encompass such interests. In the event the court has not done so, the use of the
antitakeover device will not have satisfied Unocal 1, so this interpretation of Unocal 2
will not be relevant.
154 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
155 See id. at 709, 717.
156 See id. at 709-17.
157 Id. at 709, 712, 717.
158 See id. at 708-09.
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Most courts, however, apply the reasonableness test by making
superficial assessments of the "full" value and the tender price.' 59
Though this "minimalist" form of review will generally lead a court
to rubber-stamp the directors' action and uphold the use of the
antitakeover device, t6 0 the court will not always find that the
antitakeover device is reasonable. For instance, a court engaging in
"minimalist" review will find an antitakeover device unreasonable
when it believes the device will obstruct tender offers representing
the "full" value of the target; that is, when the antitakeover device's
trigger price is greater than reasonable expectations of the target's
"full" value.' In addition, some courts have found antitakeover
devices not able to prevent harm to the shareholders to be unreason-
able. Such a situation exists when the antitakeover device is used to
159 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 252-53 (noting that the Delaware
Supreme Court in Unocal, Revlon, and Moran appeared to use a "minimalist" review in
applying the reasonableness test); Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 441 ("As
evidenced by Unocal and Moran, court review of antitakeover measures has resulted in
minimal scrutiny of these actions .... ").
160 See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 461, 475 (D. Del. 1988)
(finding antitakeover device reasonable even though the tender offer was at a
premium over the market price and the directors had not developed a more valuable
alternative); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (finding antitakeover device reasonable based on hindsight, without any
consideration of the "full" value of the target); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342, 1345 (Del. 1987) (finding antitakeover device
reasonable because tender price was less than estimates of "full" value); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (finding greenmail payment reasonable after
superficial review); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985)
(finding antitakeover device reasonable because there existed a possibility of a
prospective coercive tender offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 956-57 (Del. 1985) (finding antitakeover device reasonable because tender price
was less than directors' valuation of target); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon
Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at 90,872
(Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (finding antitakeover device reasonable because directors
received expert advice that the tender price was less than the target's "full" value);
Tate & Lyle v. Staley Continental, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,764, at 98,587 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (upholding antitakeover device
because target expressed desire to seek out either a white knight or financing for a
restructuring); Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, No. 9746, slip op. at 17-19 (Del. Ch.
April 15, 1988) (upholding antitakeover device because the directors believed that an
auction would maximize shareholder wealth);Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 333
("[C]ourts have given directors tremendous latitude in assessing the reasonableness
of the directors' response and have invalidated only those responses that are
blatantly unreasonable."); Note, supra note 76, at 288 ("Delaware courts, in practice,
show great deference toward a target board's reasonable determination that an offer
poses a threat to the corporate enterprise."); supra note 159.
161 See, e.g., CRTF Corp., 683 F. Supp. at 439 (noting that an antitakeover device
which is a "show stopper"--one that contains a "price barrier to discourage offers
below a perhaps artificially high trigger price"-will be "in and of itself, invalid").
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protect a proposed alternative to the tender offer that is not more
valuable than the tender price or the prevailing market price.
162
These holdings, however, are inapplicable to the noncoercive tender
offer model since the alternative to the tender offer in these cases
was a known value that was less than the tender price, rather than an
uncertain "full" value greater than the tender price.'
63
Other courts have applied the Unocal 2 reasonableness test with-
out using the reasonableness equation. For instance, in MAI Basic
Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer,164 the court's reasonableness test
involved a "careful[] review [of] all the factors having a bearing on
the course pursued by the directors."' 65 The MAI Basic Four court
essentially adopted an ad hoc balancing test, describing various fac-
tors to be considered and then mysteriously arriving at a result. The
factors considered by the court included: the relationship between
the market price and tender price; the probability of realizing the
target's "full" value (a function of the investment banker's projected
value of the target, the possibility of a recapitalization, and the direc-
tors' ability to extract a better tender price from the tender offeror
through hard bargaining); the good faith of the board (the presence
of independent board majority and absence of evidence of any
entrenchment motive); the directors' diligence in reaching their deci-
sion; the percentage of shares tendered by the shareholders; the
coerciveness of the tender offer's structure; and the desirability of
shareholder franchise.'
66
Other courts have defined the reasonableness of an antitakeover
device in terms of time, by examining the directors' opportunity to
realize the target's "full" value.' 6 7 This formulation recognizes that
162 See BNS, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 475; Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1057-59 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 798-99 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,071, at 91,021 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1988); Doskocil Co. v. Griggy, No. 10,095, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Aug 4, 1988);
Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241-44 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Macmillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); AC
Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113-14 (Del. Ch. 1986).
163 See, e.g., Robert l. Bass Group, 552 A.2d at 1241-44 (holding that an
antitakeover device that is used to protect a restructuring with a value less than the
tender offer is an unreasonable response).
164 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,179 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 1988).
165 Id. at 91,634.
166 See id. at 91,634-35.
167 See Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F. Supp. 595, 604
(S.D. Tex. 1988) (noting that the target's board was unsuccessful in soliciting
MAKING SENSE OF UNOCAL
the realization of "full" value depends on the directors' ability to
pursue alternative options. This ability to develop alternatives, in
most cases, is primarily a function of time. For instance, a restructur-
ing requires several weeks for the target's investment banker to
develop a plan and arrange the necessary financing. 6 ' Likewise, in
order to conduct a Revlon-style auction, the target must provide
potential white knights with enough time to assess the target's value
and raise sufficient capital for the transaction.' If the target has
been unsuccessful in its attempt to develop a restructuring plan or to
find a white knight once the necessary time for these alternative
options has passed, it is unlikely to succeed even if given further
time.' 7 ° Therefore, under this approach, a court will recognize the
probability that the directors can realize the "full" value for only a
limited period of time. Once that period has expired, however, the
court will no longer recognize this potentiality.
competitive bids, and that in the five weeks that the tender offer was outstanding, the
market indicated a fair price for the target similar to the tender offer price); Samjens
Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that
target corporation's self-tender was a reasonable response to an inadequate hostile
tender offer since designed to allow the target board to consider alternatives to
maximize shareholder wealth); see also In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,645 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1988) ("[T he poison pill... may still have a role in maximizing values. At
some future time, the poison pill may no longer serve a valid purpose but that time
has not yet arrived."); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del.
Ch.) ("[There may come a time when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to
redeem the [antitakeover device] .... ), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
168 A restructuring, depending on the type of plan, can be completed within two
to three months. See Anderson & Bibi, supra note 33, at 298. Most restructuring
plans, however, can be completed in a much shorter period of time. See id. at 296-97,
299; see also Matheson & Norberg, supra note 9, at 409 (noting that "[i]nnovative
forms of financing and changes in the banking climate make it now possible.., to
raise billions of dollars in a matter of weeks"). The two to three month time period
refers only to those recapitalizations and spin-offs which require either shareholder
approval or an SEC registration requirement. See Anderson & Bibi, supra note 33, at
295, 298-99. Hence, the time period necessary to develop the restructuring plan is
significantly less than that required to comply with the formal aspects of
implementing the plan.
169 See Andre, supra note 3, at 908 (noting that twenty business days is "too
short a time to conduct an auction"); infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text
(noting that two months is sufficient time to locate a white knight).
170 See Southdown, 686 F. Supp. at 602 (noting that the target should have been
able to find a white knight within forty days); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that if a competitive bid was a possible
alternative to the tender offer, it would have occurred within two months); supra
notes 168 & 169 and accompanying text; infra notes 230-32.
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IV. A SKELETON'S KEY FOR THE UNOCAL TEST'S AMBIGUITIES
This Comment's examination of the Unocal test's application to
the noncoercive tender offer model has revealed that the test's pres-
ent formulation is inadequate. The Unocal test contains several
ambiguous elements which are susceptible to contradictory interpre-
tations, thereby impeding the realization of consistent and uniform
outcomes. 171
This Comment recommends that courts adopt the two following
proposals to rectify these dilemmas. First, the Unocal test's ambigu-
ous elements ought to be interpreted by reference to two fundamen-
tal principles inherent in the Unocal analysis: 1) The duty of directors
to act in the shareholders' best interest 72 (hereinafter referred to as
the Shareholder Interest Principle); and 2) The appropriateness of
an intermediate standard of review1 73 (hereinafter referred to as the
Intermediate Review Principle). These principles should provide suf-
ficient guidance to the courts, giving Unocal's ambiguous terms a
standard meaning and thereby promoting the uniform application of
the test.
When the Unocal test has been applied to the noncoercive tender
offer model, the following elements have been subject to contradic-
tory interpretations by the lower courts:
1. Is the requirement that the directors demonstrate "reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effec-
tiveness existed" satisfied by a showing of "good faith and reason-
able investigation"?
174
171 See supra notes 111-70 and accompanying text.
172 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985);
supra note 62; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173,
181 (Del. 1986) ("[T]he fiduciary standards outlined in Unocal . . . require the
directors to determine the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders
This principle seems to have been adopted by Judge Posner in Dynamics Corp.
of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). While purporting to
enunciate the standard of the Unocal test,Judge Posner stated a variant of the Unocal
test emphasizing directors' fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth:
[T]he particular [antitakeover device the board] adopts must be
reasonably related to the goal of shareholder wealth maximization....
[C]ourts are not simply to rubber stamp the board's judgment but must
review it carefully to make sure that in adopting the poison pill the board
really was acting in the best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 708.
173 See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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2. Does the category of "corporate policy and effectiveness"
include the shareholder interests affected by noncoercive tender
offers? 
175
3. Under what circumstances will a noncoercive tender offer con-
stitute a danger to shareholder interests, and what probability of
realizing a "full" value greater than the tender price is sufficient for
the tender offer to constitute such a danger?1
76
4. How is a court to assess whether the antitakeover device is a
reasonable response "in relation to the threat posed"?
177
The contradictory responses to each of these questions could be
eliminated, and the ambiguities in the Unocal test resolved, if courts
were to refer to the two proposed Principles.
A. Good Faith and Reasonable Investigation Alone Do Not Satisfy
Unocal 1
Most courts have held that a showing of good faith and reason-
able investigation, without more, is insufficient to satisfy Unocal I's
requirement of "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed" because of the tender
offer.' 78 Other courts, relying on Unocal I's equivocal language,
have ruled otherwise.' 7 9 As noted above, the majority position con-
strains the scope of the directors' investigation to dangers affecting
"corporate policy and effectiveness"; the minority position imposes
no such limitation. iS0 This conflict of interpretation may be resolved
by reference to the Intermediate Review Principle.
The minority position's standard of review, like that of the busi-
ness judgment rule, will uphold the actions of directors upon a show-
ing of good faith and reasonable investigation.' 8 ' As a result, the
Unocal 1 test becomes "a toothless standard for testing whether
directors have fulfilled their duty of loyalty."'8 2 The majority posi-
tion, though, imposes a stricter scrutiny since the narrow judicial
focus on the object of investigation necessarily limits the board's dis-
cretion. Instead of a simple showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation, the board must demonstrate the existence of reason-
175 See supra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 143-70 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 116 & 117 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 68-69 & 116 and accompanying text.
182 Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 330.
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able grounds for believing the presence of "a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness." 18 3 The majority position represents the
better interpretation since it is more compatible with the Intermedi-
ate Review Principle.'
84
B. Unocal 1 ' Category of Corporate Policy and Effectiveness Should
Include Shareholder Interests
As noted above, the courts are divided on whether a noncoer-
cive tender offer's effect on shareholder interests falls within Unocal
I's category of "corporate policy and effectiveness." Some courts
have ruled that this term includes shareholder interests, others have
held that it does not, and some courts have even rejected the use of
this term in the Unocal 1 analysis.'8 5 This dispute among the courts
may be resolved by reference to the two proposed guidelines for
interpreting Unocal.
Though the view that "corporate policy and effectiveness" does
not include shareholder interests may conform with a strict reading
of the language of the Unocal 1 test, it has the consequence of
preventing directors from using antitakeover devices to obstruct any
noncoercive tender offer.' 86 Since a takeover bid in fact may harm
shareholder interests, 8 7 this interpretation conflicts with the Share-
holder Interest Principle and should be rejected.' 88
183 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
184 The minority position is inferior because it cannot be reconciled with a
natural reading of the Unocal opinion. Indeed, the minority position completely
dismisses the articulated language of the Unocal 1 test. The Delaware Supreme
Court's statement that a demonstration of good faith and reasonable investigation
satisfies Unocal I presumably was not made in a vacuum apart from the other
language of the test. A natural reading of the Unocal opinion appears to indicate that
the court intended the criteria of good faith and reasonable investigation to refer to
the board's belief that there was. a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness.
Likewise, the court's reference to the independent board majority reflects the
empirical presumption that outside directors face a less significant conflict of interest
than inside directors. See Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, 686 F.
Supp. 595, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1988); supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. But see M.
EISENBERG, supra note 33, at 145; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 382; supra notes
33 & 88 and accompanying text. Therefore, these qualifiers to the Unocal 1 test
ought not alter the substantive requirement that the directors present evidence to
demonstrate that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the tender offer
presented a "danger to corporate policy and effectiveness."
185 See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 36 & 121; supra note 137 and accompanying text.
188 This interpretation of Unocal 1 is also fallacious because it contradicts
subsequent statements by the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancellor Allen that
the Unocal test may permit the use of antitakeover devices to prevent tender offers.
MAKING SENSE OF UNOCAL
The rejection of the "corporate policy and effectiveness" cate-
gory in favor of a valid corporate purpose test is also an inappropri-
ate interpretation of Unocal 1. The dismissal of the language of
Unocal 1 is grounded on a literal interpretation of "corporate policy
and effectiveness" and departs from the valued policy of permitting
directors to act in the shareholders' interest.18 9 This rationale, how-
ever, is satisfactory only to the extent that the resulting interpreta-
tion is consistent with the Intermediate Review Principle. If Unocal 1
is satisfied where the antitakeover device merely serves a valid corpo-
rate purpose, the level of judicial scrutiny is effectively reduced to
that of the business judgment rule.' As such, this interpretation
should be rejected.
The view that "corporate policy and effectiveness" includes
shareholder interests appears to be the best reading of Unocal 1.
This interpretation is consistent with the Shareholder Interest Princi-
ple because it permits directors to use antitakeover devices to protect
shareholders from the possible harm caused by noncoercive tender
offers. In addition, this view does not cause the Unocal test to deviate
from an intermediate level of review; directors still must show rea-
sonable grounds for believing the tender offer a danger to share-
holder interests.'
9 '
C. A Noncoercive Tender Offer is a Danger to Shareholder Interests Where
the Tender Price is Less Than a "Full" Value Projection
The courts have also disagreed about what constitutes a reason-
able belief that a noncoercive tender offer threatens shareholder
interests. As noted above, this question addresses the reasonable-
ness of the directors' belief that "full" value may be greater than the
tender price. 192 Some courts have found the directors' belief unrea-
sonable when based upon biased or improbable projections of the
target's value or when the directors had not realized a "full" value
See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del. 1985); City Capital Assocs.
v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1988).
189 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
191 This requirement imposes a greater burden than the business judgment
rule. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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despite ample time to do so. 193 Most courts, however, have not
addressed this issue.
1 94
The most appropriate method by which to evaluate the reasona-
bleness of a belief in the potentiality of a "full" value may be deter-
mined by reference to both the Intermediate Review Principle and
the Shareholder Interest Principle. Those courts that do not address
the reasonableness of the directors' belief will find the Unocal 1 test
of the antitakeover device congruent with the business judgment
rule. By not examining the reasonableness of the directors' belief,
this position interprets Unocal 1 to require only that the noncoercive
tender offer affect "corporate policy and effectiveness." Since all
noncoercive tender offers affect "corporate policy and effectiveness"
as defined above by the Shareholder Interest Principle,' 95 this for-
mulation of Unocal 1 would not impose an "enhanced duty" upon the
directors and should be rejected.
Some courts have held that a belief is unreasonable where the
board has not realized a "full" value after a considerable period of
time. This position, however, is inconsistent with the Shareholder
Interest Principle. While some of the alternatives intended to realize
a "full" value may have standard time-frames, 96 other options, such
as negotiating with the tender offeror for a higher price or waiting
for a market adjustment, do not.' 97 Anyjudicial analysis in which a
fixed period of time is dispositive impedes the directors' ability to
realize a "full" value. Therefore, an interpretation of Unocal 2 which
produces such an analysis is undesirable.'
98
In contrast, other courts have held that the directors' belief is
reasonable provided it is not based upon biased or unrealistic pro-
jections. This position is concordant with both the Shareholder
Interest Principle and the Intermediate Review Principle. Further, it
imposes no constraints on the directors' ability to promote share-
holder interests since it does not enjoin the antitakeover device
where "full" value may probably be realized.' 99 At the same time,
this position provides for an intermediate review of the directors'
action. By requiring directors to demonstrate the potentiality of
realizing a "full" value, this formulation imposes a greater duty than
193 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 140.
195 See supra text accompanying note 191.
196 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
198 See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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does the business judgment rule, which does not demand such a par-
ticular presentation of evidence.2"0 In addition, this reading of Uno-
cal I avoids the pitfalls of the intrinsic fairness test because the courts
do not independently assess the target's "full" value to verify the
legitimacy of the directors' belief.20 1 In light of the Intermediate
Review Principle and the Shareholder Interest Principle, this Com-
ment advocates an interpretation of Unocal I that requires the direc-
tors to present evidence of the probability of realizing "full" value if
the tender offer is obstructed by the antitakeover device.
A somewhat similar position has been put forward in an article
by Gilson and Kraakman. 20 2 The authors suggest that Unocal should
"require[] a showing of how-and when-management expects a tar-
get's shareholders to do better.... [M]anagement must set forth its
plan in sufficient detail to permit the court independently to evaluate
the plausibility of management's claim." 2 3 Gilson and Kraakman's
proposal, however, differs from that of this Comment. The authors
imply that courts should make an independent evaluation of the
directors' projection of "full" value.20 4 Since such a substantive
analysis demands ajudicial review similar to that of the intrinsic fair-
ness test, it conflicts with the Intermediate Review Principle and is
therefore undesirable.
Critics of this Comment's proposed interpretation of Unocal 1
might contend that it imposes no greater duty than does the business
judgment rule, which upholds antitakeover devices promoting a valid
corporate purpose. In the context of a noncoercive tender offer, the
only such purpose is to increase shareholder wealth by enabling
management to pursue an alternative option. As such, critics might
conclude that under the business judgment rule, directors must pres-
ent the same evidence as that required by the proposed Unocal 1
interpretation. This criticism, however, is flawed because the busi-
ness judgment rule's due diligence component does not require
presentation of evidence that the target's "full" value is greater than
200 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 83 and accompanying text; supra text following note 84; see also
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
202 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2.
203 Id. at 268.
204 Compare supra text following note 84 (stating that the intrinsic fairness test
requires courts to make an independent evaluation of the directors' decision) with
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 270-71 ("[T]he court must be free to exercise its
independent judgment in weighing whether management's plans present a plausible
story: a goal that improves on the value of the hostile offer and a means that is
reasonably likely to achieve the goal.").
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the tender price. This point is dramatically illustrated in Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co.,"' 5 where the Seventh Circuit found that the
directors had satisfied the business judgment rule despite the "strik-
ing paucity of evidence on how [the target's] value might have been
'diminished by a [hostile tender] offer.' "206
Other critics might contend that a court's blind acceptance of
valuations done by the target's investment banker will invite inaccu-
rate projections. While this concern has merit given the diminished
credibility of investment bankers,20 7 this argument has two main
weaknesses. First, courts could reduce the potential for self-serving
valuations by requiring the investment banker to demonstrate some
degree of independence from the tender offeror, perhaps by forego-
ing compensation on a contingency fee basis. 208 Second, an institu-
tional barrier discourages inaccurate projections since such
projections may damage the investment banker's reputation in the
financial community.
20 9
D. Reasonableness of the Antitakeover Device: In Search of Intermediate
Judicial Review
As demonstrated above, courts have diverged widely in applying
Unocal 2's reasonableness test to the use of an antitakeover device.
Some courts have utilized the reasonableness equation with varying
degrees of scrutiny, others have assessed reasonableness in terms of
time, and still another has adopted an ad hoc balancing test.
2 10
These analyses are inadequate since each violates the Shareholder
Interest Principle, the Intermediate Review Principle, or both.
The use of the reasonableness equation, either in its minimalist
or strict scrutiny form, is incompatible with the Intermediate Review
Principle. As noted above, the reasonableness equation will uphold
an antitakeover device where (FV - TP) (pFV) - (TP - SV) (pSV) >
0.21 Any application of the reasonableness equation requires a
court to make findings regarding the equation's unknown elements:
205 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
206 Id. at 306 n.14 (Cudahy, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting majority opinion, id. at 296).
207 See supra note 34.
208 Cf Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 710-11 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that investment banker's valuation lacked credibility because
investment banker's compensation was contingent upon the target defeating the
tender offer).
209 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 272.
210 See supra notes 150-70 and accompanying text.
211 See supra text preceding note 151.
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"FV," "pFV," "SV," and "pSV." '212 Depending upon the court's
degree of analysis in determining these quantities, the standard of
review will resemble either the intrinsic fairness test or the business
judgment rule.
Where a court employs the strict scrutiny version of the reasona-
bleness equation and endeavors to estimate precisely these variables,
it is effectively making an independent evaluation of the situation fac-
ing the directors. 21 3 Such a substantive review of the merits of the
directors' decision resembles the intrinsic fairness test's strict scru-
tiny, and is therefore undesirable.
21 4
Conversely, where a court employs the minimalist version of the
reasonableness equation and is satisfied with less precise estimates of
the equation's unknown variables, the court is effectively deferring to
the directors' decision in a manner akin to the business judgment
rule.
Both the minimalist interpretation and the business judgment
rule will enjoin an antitakeover device under the same circumstances.
For instance, courts using the minimalist version of the reasonable-
ness equation have found an antitakeover device unreasonable where
it protects a restructuring valued at less than the tender price, 21 5 or
where the trigger price of the antitakeover device is not based on
reasonable expectations of the target's "full" value.216 The business
212 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,283-84 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) ("[T]he innovative and
constructive rule of Unocal must be cautiously applied lest the important benefits of
the business judgment rule (including designation of authority to make business and
financial decisions to agencies: i.e., boards of directors, with substantive expertise) be
eroded or lost by slow degrees."), aff'd, Literary Partners v. Time, Inc. (Del.July 24,
1989) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.) ("The danger that [Unocal's reasonableness test] poses is, of
course, that courts - in exercising some element of substantive judgment - will too
readily seek to assert the primacy of their own view on a question upon which
reasonable, completely disinterested minds might differ."), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d
1070 (Del. 1988);Johnson & Siegel, supra note 28, at 333 ("Analyzing the seriousness
of the threat and the appropriateness of the directors' response to that threat,
however, requires the courts to substitute their business judgment for that of the
directors."); Kreider, supra note 4, at 128 (in deciding "whether a reasonable belief
exists that the actions taken are in the best interests of the corporation... courts are
second guessing to some degree the 'business judgment' of the directors by
imposing their own judgments in the interest of fairness to shareholders"); Oesterle,
supra note 10, at 118 n.7 (questioning whether the reasonableness test differs from
the intrinsic fairness test).
215 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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judgment rule would also enjoin the antitakeover device in both of
these cases. In the former case, the measure would be enjoined
because the antitakeover device does not serve a valid business pur-
pose; in the latter case, because the unreasonable projections do not
satisfy the due diligence component of the business judgment
rule.
217
Thus, the use of the equation to assess the reasonableness of the
antitakeover device converts the Unocal test into a standard of review
resembling either the business judgment rule or the intrinsic fairness
test. As a result, the Intermediate Review Principle rejects the use of
the reasonableness equation as Unocal 2's reasonableness test.
Other methods used by the courts to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of antitakeover devices are also undesirable. Although assess-
ing the reasonableness of an antitakeover device in terms of time2 18
avoids the inherent dilemma of the reasonableness equation, it con-
flicts with the Shareholder Interest Principle, and is consequently
unacceptable. Time constraints on the use of an antitakeover device
severely handicap a target board's ability to negotiate with the tender
offeror for a better price. When the target's value would be maxi-
mized under the tender offeror's ownership, and this value is greater
than the tender price, the target board could reasonably expect that
negotiations with the tender offeror would result in a better offer.
219
If a court enjoined the use of an antitakeover device after a specified
period of time, the tender offeror would refuse to negotiate with the
target board and simply wait out the time period. Likewise, if the
target's "full" value can be realized only by waiting for a market
adjustment, a time limit on the use of an antitakeover device would
preclude this option as well. As a consequence, the target's share-
holders would lose the difference between the "full" value and the
tender price. Therefore, evaluating the reasonableness of an
antitakeover device in terms of time is undesirable.
220
In contrast to the time-oriented approach, the MAI Basic Four ad
hoc balancing test is not necessarily in conflict with either the Share-
holder Interest Principle or the Intermediate Review Principle. A
court conceivably could employ such a balancing test in a manner
compatible with both of these principles. An ad hoc balancing test,
217 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
220 Cf MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1251
(Del. Ch. 1985) ("The function of the Court is not to define the terms of negotiations
in advance .... "), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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however, is seriously flawed because it impinges upon society's need
for predictable and uniform judicial decisions.22 ' Although the MAI
Basic Four court concluded that the directors' use of the antitakeover
device in that case was reasonable, it did not apply a specific test in
making its decision.222 Since it has no underlying rationale, the
opinion has minimal precedential value; subsequent courts cannot
employ usefully MAI Basic Four's holding when a different set of facts
is encountered.223 In addition, the adoption of an ad hoc balancing
test to determine the reasonableness of an antitakeover device would
increase the likelihood of inconsistent outcomes. Therefore, this
form of analysis should also be rejected.
Since these versions of the reasonableness test are inadequate, a
new formulation of the review consistent with Unocal's underlying
principles is needed. The Shareholder Interest Principle indicates
that an antitakeover device ought to provide the directors with an
opportunity to realize the target's "full" value. As noted above, the
ability to realize a "full" value is a function of time for two of the four
alternative options that the board may pursue. 224 Consequently, this
Comment proposes that courts assess the reasonableness of an
antitakeover device by reference to the following set of presumptions
which relate to the time directors need to develop alternatives to a
tender offer. The proposed presumptions are as follows:
1. For the first two months after the commencement of the tender
offer,225 the antitakeover device will be presumed unreasonable
unless the directors present evidence that there is a probability of
realizing a "full" value greater than the tender price. Such evi-
dence consists of an investment banker's projection that the target
221 SeeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7, at 20 (3d ed.
1988); see also Oesterle, supra note 10, at 118 (noting concern "over the prospect of
unpredictable, ad hoc decisions in tender offer cases"); Veasey, supra note 28, at 512
(warning against "random ad hoc decisions" in the review of antitakeover devices).
222 See MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179, at 91,635 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988).
223 In addition, the MAI Basic Four analysis is inappropriate because it departed
from the type of review required by Unocal. The MAI Basic Four court .did not use the
reasonableness equation and included other elements in its determination of
reasonableness, thereby misconstruing the Unocal test. Compare supra text preceding
note 166 (listing factors the MAI Basic Four court considered) with supra text
preceding note 151 (describing the elements in the reasonableness equation).
224 See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
225 Frequently, the tender offeror will seek to enjoin the antitakeover device
upon announcing her intention to make a tender offer. For the purposes of the
proposed presumptions, the announcement of such an intention will be treated as
equivalent to the commencement of the tender offer.
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may have a "full" value greater than the tender price if an alterna-
tive option is pursued.
22 6
2. After the two-month period, the antitakeover device will be
presumed unreasonable unless the. directors demonstrate that
there is a substantial probability of maximizing shareholder wealth
through negotiations with the tender offeror. This evidence con-
sists of an investment banker's projection that the target's subjec-
tive value to the tender offeror is substantially greater than the
tender price.
2 27
If the target's directors satisfy this burden, they will then have a duty
to engage in good faith negotiations with the tender offeror to real-
ize this value.2 21 While this duty to negotiate does not compel the
target's directors to agree to a merger with the tender offeror for a
price less than the projected "full" value, it does require that the
directors actively attempt to realize this "full" value. This duty is
consistent with the directors' fiduciary duty of loyalty and creates a
constraint on the directors' inherent conflict of interest in corporate
control contests.
22 9
These presumptions are compatible with the Shareholder Inter-
est Principle because they enable the directors to realize the target's
"full" value. The initial presumption will uphold an antitakeover
device if the directors demonstrate that there is a probability of real-
izing a "full" value. The presumption will not prevent the directors
from pursuing any alternative option that may enhance shareholder
wealth. While the second presumption does limit the directors'
options to negotiating only with the tender offeror, this constraint is
226 This is essentially a restatement of this Comment's proposed interpretation
of Unocal 1. See supra text following note 201.
227 "Substantially greater" shall mean any projection where the "full" value
exceeds the tender price by at least twenty percent of the tender price's premium
over the pre-tender market price. In terms of an equation, a "full" value will be
substantially greater than the tender price where .2(FV - TP) - (TP - MP) = 0. This
requirement recognizes that the shareholders' interests may not be served when a
tender offer significantly above the market price is prevented, and perhaps eventually
reduced or withdrawn, in an attempt to ensure one more dollar for each shareholder.
While the proposed percentage is necessarily arbitrary, this requirement is necessary
to protect shareholders.
228 The definition of "good faith negotiations" will be the same as that of the
"obligation to bargain collectively" in the National Labor Relations Act, namely, "to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to... the negotiation
of an agreement .... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
229 See supra notes 62 & 64 and accompanying text; infra notes 242-44 and
accompanying text.
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justified in light of the practical aspects of the other alternatives.230
If the target cannot develop an adequately financed restructuring
plan within two months after announcement of the tender offer, it is
unlikely to succeed in doing so at all.231 Similarly, two months of
unsuccessful solicitation of a white knight indicates the improbability
that a suitor will suddenly change its mind and proffer a competing
bid.2 2 The one option the second presumption precludes is waiting
for the market to recognize the "full" value of the target.
As noted above, the market is not necessarily an accurate mea-
sure of a corporation's true value.233 Consequently, the preclusion
of potential market appreciation is detrimental to shareholder inter-
ests if the target directors are correct in their valuation.23 4 Con-
versely, the shareholders are not denied the opportunity to realize
the premium paid by the tender offeror when the directors are incor-
rect. A comparison of the potential harm in each scenario indicates
that the shareholders will suffer more where the tender offer is
obstructed indefinitely. Empirical evidence suggests that there is lit-
tle likelihood of market appreciation after a tender offer is with-
drawn.2 3 5 Moreover, if the target is substantially undervalued by the
market, the directors could engage in either a restructuring or a Rev-
lon-style auction since the investment banker's evaluation of these
options draws from data similar to that used to project potential mar-
ket appreciation.23 6
230 While the establishment of a two-month limit for the target may appear
arbitrary, other commentators have proposed similar time periods for which the use
of defensive tactics is justified. Lipton suggests that the target board should be given
120 calendar days "to evaluate a bid and to consider alternatives .... Such an
extension would give the board a realistic opportunity to determine whether the
target is best served by remaining independent or, if a sale is desired, whether the
first offeror has made the most advantageous bid .... Lipton, supra note 36, at 62.
Similarly, Andre proposes that tender offers should remain open for sixty calendar
days as opposed to the twenty business days required by current securities law. See
Andre, supra note 3, at 908. He reasons that this period would "provide ample time
for prospective bidders to research the target and make offers .... Id. at 908-09.
231 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 3 & 49 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
236 Compare supra notes 43-45 (noting that the valuation of a restructuring is
dependent upon the value of the company's assets) and supra note 46 (noting that a
bidder's valuation of the target reflects the value of the target's assets) with supra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text (noting that the belief that market appreciation
will occur is based on the underlying value of the target's assets). Gilson and
Kraakman state that if managers are correct in their expectation of market
appreciation, they "have a fiduciary responsibility to attempt to correct [the]
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The proposed presumptions concerning an antitakeover
device's reasonableness are consistent with the Intermediate Review
Principle. Both presumptions place a greater burden on the target
directors than does the business judgment rule.23 7 These presump-
tions, however, are not as strict as the intrinsic fairness test since
they do not require the courts independently to evaluate the
probability that a "full" value may be realized.
23
Critics might contend that this Comment's imposition of a duty
on the target directors to negotiate a merger with the tender offeror
is contrary to the Delaware General Corporation Law. That statute
provides in its relevant parts that the directors have the authority to
decide whether to engage in a merger or not.2 39 Given this mandate,
this Comment's proposal conflicts with the directors' legislatively
granted authority to govern a corporation.
Whether the directors' duty of loyalty requires the maximization
of current share value in the context of a noncoercive tender offer is
an issue that has not been directly addressed by the Delaware
courts. 24  In essence, this question relates to issues of corporate
governance that are beyond the scope of thisComment.
2 4' It is suf-
ficient to note that Chancellor Allen has indicated that this duty may
exist where a tender offer is not conditioned upon financing arrange-
ments or the directors' agreement to negotiate a merger with the
underpricing." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 269 n.72. If management is able
to increase the market price above the tender price, the antitakeover device would no
longer be necessary since shareholders would probably not tender their shares.
237 The business judgment rule's duty of due care does not demand that the
directors present the type of evidence required by the proposed presumptions. See
supra notes 183, 200, 205-06 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text; supra text preceding note 85.
239 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988) ("The board of
directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate ...." (emphasis
added)).
240 See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475-76 (D. Del. 1988); TW
Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at
92,181 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); see also Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,278-81 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(stating that although under the particular facts Time's directors were not required
to maximize current share value, "a decision not to redeem a poison pill . . .may
present distinctive considerations than those presented in this case"), aff'd sub nom.
Literary Partners v. Time, Inc. (Del. July 24, 1989) (available on LEXIS and
WESTLAW).
The directors' duty in the context of a noncoercive tender offer is to be
contrasted with their duty to maximize current share value in the Revlon-mode and
their prerogative to forsake immediate value maximization in ordinary business
matters. See id. at 93,277-78.
241 For a broad analysis of these issues, see generally Lipton, supra note 36.
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tender offeror.242 Since the noncoercive tender offer in this Com-
ment contains neither of these conditions, one might expect that the
Delaware courts would impose this duty upon the target directors.243
In any event, the directors of a corporation have a duty to act in the
best interests of the shareholders. In the noncoercive tender offer
context, this duty would require the target's directors to attempt to
negotiate with the tender offeror for the target's "full" value.
244
CONCLUSION
The widespread use of antitakeover devices to obstruct noncoer-
cive tender offers has created a dilemma for Delaware's courts.
245
The target directors' inherent conflict of interest in corporate con-
trol contests presents a potential for abuse that is greater than that
contemplated by the business judgment rule but less than that of the
intrinsic fairness test.246  Since the judicial review of directors'
actions should reflect the potential for directorial abuse, an interme-
diate standard is required to properly evaluate the use of antitake-
over devices.
2 47
The Delaware Supreme Court recognized this problem in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and attempted to formulate an intermedi-
ate standard of review. 24 8 The present version of the Unocal test has
proved unsatisfactory because it contains ambiguous language that
has led to its inconsistent application. 249 The greatest failing of the
Unocal test, however, lies in its attempt to create an intermediate
242 See TW Ser-s., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,178-80.
243 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In fact, Chancellor Allen has even
suggested that the target directors' duty of due care may require negotiations with
the tender offeror to find out the highest price it will pay. See City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 803 n.21 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.J.), appeal dismissed,
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); see also In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No.
9991, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (Allen, CJ.) (noting that duty of due care
in corporate control contests "places a special burden upon the directors to make
sure that they have a basis for an informed view" and that the Special Committee
there purportedly intended to make "an effective check of the market"). Vice
Chancellor Jacobs has also intimated that the duty of due care may require the
directors to inquire into the possibility that the tender offeror may increase its tender
price. See Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1240-41 (Del. Ch.)
(Jacobs, J.), appeal dismissed sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, 548
A.2d 498 (Del. 1988).
244 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 90, 92-93 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 111-70 and accompanying text.
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level of review that involves an evaluation of the antitakeover
device's reasonableness. This determination necessarily requires a
court to judge the merits of the directors' decision. 210 This form of
judicial review effectively substitutes the court's judgment for that of
the directors by applying a standard of review akin to the intrinsic
fairness test.2 1 This is particularly true in the noncoercive tender
offer context, in which the business decision involves the comparison
of two quantities: the tender price and the target's "full" value.
252
Either one value or the other is greater; there is no middle ground.
Many courts have simply avoided this degree of scrutiny and have
applied a standard of review equivalent to the business judgment
rule.255
This Comment has demonstrated that the ambiguous aspects of
the Unocal test may be resolved by reference to two underlying prin-
ciples in the Unocal opinion: that directors must act in the sharehold-
ers' best interests, and that courts should engage in an intermediate
review of directors' actions in corporate control contests.254 This
Comment suggests that courts adopt a set of presumptions to guide
their determination of an antitakeover device's reasonableness.
These presumptions provide an intermediate standard of review
because they are more demanding than the business judgment rule,
yet they do not require a substantive evaluation of the directors'
decision, as does the intrinsic fairness test.255 In addition, since
these presumptions reflect the economic realities facing the target
corporation, they do not impinge upon the directors' ability to pur-
sue an alternative option that would maximize shareholder
wealth.256 More importantly, this Comment's definition of reasona-
bleness will promote certainty and uniformity through its establish-
ment of a bright-line rule for courts and corporate combatants. This
Comment's proposed reformulation of the Unocal test meets the Del-
aware Supreme Court's call for a truly intermediate standard of
review and fulfills the need for uniformity and predictability in
antitakeover law.
250 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; supra text preceding note 151.
251 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
252 See supra text accompanying note 151.
253 See supra notes 160-63 & 215-17 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 172-202 & 211-38 and accompanying text.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
256 See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
